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GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES: A
MARKET AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
CHRISTOPHER CHEN* & LAUREN YU-HSIN LIN**
This Article examines how regulators and a company’s stakeholders
can and should respond to external political interference from a foreign
government. This Article argues that the interactions created by different
stakeholders influence the market’s response to such interference. This
Article uses the “Party building” political movement in China to illustrate
how Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong reacted to interference from
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Party building is the CCP’s
attempt to strengthen its control of listed companies by: having CCP
organization’s in a company (organizational interference), controlling
management decisions (management interference), and controlling human
resources (human resources interference). The political campaign offers a
rare chance to observe how corporate stakeholders respond to external
political interference from another country. This Article shows that fewer
than a third of the companies examined were early adopters of Party
building provisions. This suggests that managers have not been willing to
accept political interference, especially when their companies are registered
outside of China. However, companies that have adopted “Party building”
provisions in their corporate charters have generally accepted some
organizational interference or managerial interference. Still, they have been
less accommodating to more direct control over personnel or human
resources decisions. Consequently, this Article argues that securities
regulators, in an open market, should adopt a market-driven approach to
counter foreign political interference that empowers shareholders by
increasing transparency, instead of implementing drastic interventions, such
as mandatory delisting.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article examines how securities regulators should respond to the
political influence exercised by a foreign government on companies listed
on its domestic securities exchange. Should a securities regulator rely on
market power to curb foreign political interference? Alternatively, should a
host regulator adopt stringent measures to combat foreign powers? The
efficiency of either approach depends on the reactions of corporate
stakeholders. The importance of an appropriate response to foreign political
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interference is accentuated by reports of foreign interference in elections1
and China’s rise as a political and economic power.2
There is little doubt that political pressure, from domestic or foreign
actors, can affect listed companies when a stock market is international and
has many foreign listed entities, such as the New York Stock Exchange.3
Political influence by a foreign government (“foreign political interference”
or external political interference) raises two key questions: (1) whether
foreign political influence on the corporate governance of a locally listed
company hurts the targeted firms’ value or the overall market; and (2) how
the host market regulator should deal with such interference. For
clarification, the term “host market regulator” refers to the securities
regulator of the stock exchange where a foreign company is listed. For
example, for Chinese companies listed for trading in Hong Kong: the home
market would be in Mainland China and consequently, the home government
would be the Chinese government. Conversely, the Hong Kong stock market
is the host market and Hong Kong’s regulators (such as the Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Exchange) are the
host regulators.
This Article posits that political interference into the governance of a
company should be deterred. This Article generally refers to ‘political
interference’ as an exercise of power by political actors to influence a
corporate decision. Political interference can take many forms: from political
connections or appointees, to ordering a company to comply with a demand.4

1. For example, there were allegations that Russia interfered with the U.S. presidential election in
2016. See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 27, 2020, 1:25 PM),
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/12/us/2016-presidential-election-investigation-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8DV4-25KL]; 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 28, 2020,
3:12 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.
html [https://perma.cc/5FCM-L6KQ]. There is also concern that China meddled with Taiwan’s
presidential election in January 2020. See, e.g., Sheridan Prasso & Samson Ellis, China’s Information
War on Taiwan Ramps Up as Election Nears, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2019, 4:00 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-23/china-s-information-war-on-taiwan-ramps-upas-election-nears [https://perma.cc/8DTR-GUDS].
2. For example, the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) on a purchasing power parity basis
amounted to less than 5% of global GDP in the 1980s but it has amounted to over 15% of global GDP
since 2012 and has surpassed the share of GDP of the United States in relation to global GDP. See Wayne
M. Morrison, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS,
CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11 fig.7 (2019).
3. Based on the information provided by the New York Stock Exchange, there are 507 non-U.S.
issuers listed for trading in the New York market as of April 30, 2020. See Current List of All Non-U.S.
Issuers, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/data/
CurListofallStocks.pdf [https://perma.cc/62KX-NGMX].
4. See infra Part II.A.1.
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Although political connections may benefit a company,5 political
interference generally depresses a company’s value.6
Interference depresses a company’s value by exacerbating the costs
associated with the principal-agent problem. In general, a relationship
between the principal (i.e., the company) and its agents (i.e., the managers)
implies some information asymmetry and moral hazard. For example,
managers may use company resources’ for their personal benefit.7 To
counter this, the principal (i.e., the company) incurs monitoring costs to
reduce the risk of misconduct.8 Management’s wrongful conduct could also
create losses.9 Those costs, or losses, are commonly referred to as “agency
costs,” which hurt the company’s value.10 When foreign powers interfere in
a company’s corporate governance, managers may be pressured to make
decisions that benefit politicians, rather than the company and its
shareholders. If so, it could result in losses to the company (e.g. the company
providing services at a lower price to the politician) and thereby increasing
the agency costs.
Political interference also increases the risk of corruption or
wrongdoing, such as “tunneling” or disadvantageous related-party
transactions.11 For example, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) experience
some degree of political intervention due to state ownership. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted
that SOEs might suffer from “undue hands-on and politically motivated
ownership interference, leading to unclear lines of responsibility, a lack of
accountability and efficiency losses in the corporate operations.”12 To
illustrate, the Chinese government ordered state-owned banks to extend
credit to rescue its’ economy during the global financial crisis.13 Without the

5. See infra Part II.A.2.
6. See infra Part II.A.2.
7. See generally Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63
AM. ECON. ASS’N 134 (1973) (discussing issues related to agency, such as moral hazard and information
asymmetry).
8. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. “Tunneling” generally refers to “the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling
shareholder (who is typically also a top manager).” Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
22, 22 (2000).
12. OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 12 (2015
ed. 2015) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES].
13. Giant Reality-Check, ECONOMIST: FIN. & ECON. (Aug. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Giant RealityCheck], http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21584331-four-worlds-biggest-lend
ers-must-face-some-nasty-truths-giant-reality-check [https://perma.cc/7425-G463].
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order, bank managers would have been less likely to extend credit to a
borrower if it meant higher risk of default after the financial crisis.14 Whether
SOEs operate efficiently and whether they should be wholly or partially
privatized is beyond this Article’s scope. However, even when an SOE is
partially state-owned, concerns that political interference might affect the
overall market and other non-state shareholders remain. Because of the
agency costs to the company and stakeholders, political interference should
be avoided.
The strategies that securities regulators adopt to manage political
interference depends on various factors. A regulator is part of its’ domestic
government and, consequently, subject to politics. For example, an
independent financial regulator, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission in the United States, “provide[s] greater confidence and trust
that regulatory decisions are made with integrity.”15 An independent
regulator is more likely to maintain competitive neutrality when government
and non-governmental entities are regulated under the same framework.16
Independence and impartiality are crucial when regulatory conduct has a
significant impact on the industry.17 However, the independence, and
consequently effectiveness, of a regulator depends on its domestic
government’s institutional integrity.
In the case of foreign interference, how securities regulators (“host
regulators”) respond also depends on the relationship between the
government of the company’s home country and the government hosting the
stock exchange (“host market”). There are also difficulties with enforcing
rules against breaches of directors’ duties or inappropriate disclosures by a
foreign company. For example, host regulators may not be able to serve
notice, secure evidence, or freeze assets when a company primarily operates
in another jurisdiction.18 The lengths to which a securities regulator must go
to address foreign political interference also depends on how domestic
corporate stakeholders react to foreign political influence.

14. There was a debt bubble occurring in China after the 2008 global financial crisis. Why China’s
Debt Defaults Are More Alarming This Time, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2020, 11:18 AM) [hereinafter
China’s Debt Defaults], https://www.bloombergquint.com/quicktakes/why-china-s-debt-defaults-aremore-alarming-this-time-quicktake [https://perma.cc/5RTU-PE86].
15. OECD, THE GOVERNANCE OF REGULATORS: BEING AN INDEPENDENT REGULATOR 34 (2016).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Wai Yee Wan et al., Public and Private Enforcement of Corporate and Securities
Laws: An Empirical Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 319, 334–35
(2019) (suggesting the difficulty of gathering evidence against directors, particularly in foreign listings,
as a possible explanation for the rarity of private enforcement actions brought against directors in Hong
Kong and Singapore).
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This Article explores how corporate stakeholders, namely managers
and current and prospective shareholders,19 react to foreign political
interference. Their response to foreign political interference informs a
securities regulator’s approach. This Article also examines responses that a
host regulator may adopt when facing political interference by a foreign
government or political entity. Potential regulatory responses include: no
action; moderate measures, such as insisting on disclosure and transparency;
or stringent measures, like delisting or prohibitions from listing. As
previously suggested, each approach must be evaluated within the context of
a given market.
This Article examines responses to external political interference
through the CCP’s “Party building” (or dangjian) political movement, an
intrusion into the governance of Chinese companies listed on a foreign stock
exchange.20 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party) already had
some presence in some Chinese companies before the recent Party building
movement. By the end of 2016, approximately 67.8% of the 2.73 million
private enterprises in China had a Party organization representing the CCP
(e.g. committee comprising of CCP members) in the companies.21 The CCP
attempted to further strengthen its role in the governance of SOEs through
Party building.22 In October 2016, President Xi Jinping made a speech reaffirming the CCP’s leadership of SOEs,23 stressing that Party organizations

19. See generally MASAHIKO AOKI, CORPORATIONS IN EVOLVING DIVERSITY: COGNITION,
GOVERNANCE, AND INSTITUTIONS 20 (2010) (discussing the separation of control and management in a
corporate structure); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 21 (2006) (discussing how ownership, management, and
employment fit together in a firm).
20. Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangong Ting (中共中央办公厅) [General Office of the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee], Guanyu Zai Shenhua Guoyou Qiye Gaige Zhong Jianchi Dang de
Lingdao Jiaqiang Dang de Jianshe de Ruogan Yijian (关于在深化国有企业改革中坚持党的领导加强
党的建设的若干意见) [The Opinions on Upholding Party Leadership and Strengthening Party Building
in Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Sept. 20, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201509/20/content_2935593.htm [https://perma.cc/785G-XRZX].
21. Xianchu Zhang, Integration of CCP Leadership with Corporate Governance: Leading Role or
Dismemberment?, 1 CHINA PERSP. 55, 60 (2019).
22. Id. For more details on the meaning of Party building in addition to having party organizations
in the company, see infra Part III.A.
23. Xi Jinping Zongshuji Dui Guoqi Dangjian Gongzuo Ti Le Naxie Xin Yaoqiu (習近平總書記對
國企黨建工作提了哪些新要求) [New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping Regarding
State-Owned Enterprises’ Party Building Works], ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG XINWEN WANG (中国
共产党新闻网） [CPC NEWS] (Oct. 12, 2016, 10:52 AM) [hereinafter New Requirements Raised by
General Secretary Xi Jinping], http://dangjian.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/1012/c11709228772532.html [https://perma.cc/BW2P-P3SU].

CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

INTERFERENCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES

5/27/2021 10:16 PM

307

must be incorporated into a company’s governance framework.24 He also
emphasized the importance of the CCP’s leadership for SOE managers, and
the Party’s goals as an important objective of the company.25 It was a sign
that the Chinese government was “unwilling to relinquish too much control
over China’s state companies.”26
However, the CCP did not confine Party building to SOEs. The
campaign extends to private enterprises, joint ventures between SOEs and
foreign companies,27 and foreign enterprises in China.28 The latest
amendment to the Code of Corporate Governance, issued by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), required all listed companies to
implement CCP organization and provide resources for the Party
organization.29 Listed companies must also include Party provisions in their
corporate constitution.30 This increases the risk that the CCP could influence
privately held and even foreign companies. This also impedes foreign
regulators, also known as host market regulators, from curbing the growing
influence of the CCP over cross-listed Chinese businesses.31
This Article examines how companies listed on the Hong Kong
Exchange (HKEx), with assets, earnings, or significant activities in
Mainland China (“Chinese businesses”), responded to President Xi Jinping’s

24. Id. A Party organization is an organization or committee comprised of members of CCP in the
company. SCOTT LIVINGSTON, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., THE NEW CHALLENGE OF
COMMUNIST CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–3, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
publication/210114_Livingston_New_Challenge.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ25-MAAA] (last visited Mar.
25, 2021). A Party organization follows instructions from leaders of the CCP. Id.
25. New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23.
26. Emily Feng, Xi Jinping Reminds China’s State Companies of Who’s the Boss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/world/asia/china-soe-state-owned-enterprises.html
[https://perma.cc/9UHF-ATEP].
27. Lucy Hornby, Communist Party Asserts Control over China Inc, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/29ee1750-a42a-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2 [https://perma.cc/8J29-3S2J].
28. Alexandra Stevenson, China’s Communists Rewrite the Rules for Foreign Businesses, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/business/china-communist-party-foreignbusinesses.html [https://perma.cc/3B6T-SBQJ].
29. Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则) [Code of Corporate Governance for
Listed Companies in China] (promulgated by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n & State Econ. & Trade
Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2002, revised Sept. 2018), art. 5, [hereinafter China Corporate Governance Code],
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/zjhpublic/zjh/201809/P020180930584077967335.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4BHLNLK].
30. Id.
31. Shirley Yam, Opinion, Regulators’ Silence on Communist Party Presence in Listed State
Companies Is Deafening, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 20, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.scmp.com/
business/article/1993277/regulators-silence-communist-party-presence-listed-state-companies [https://
perma.cc/76FB-J5AA]; Jennifer Hughes, China’s Communist Party Writes Itself into Company Law, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a4b28218-80db-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd
[https://perma.cc/967P-SAT3].
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Party building campaign. Although Chinese businesses operate
predominantly in China, they can be incorporated in Mainland China or an
offshore jurisdiction, like Bermuda.32 After examining corporate
stakeholders reactions, the Article then explores how host regulators (e.g.,
Hong Kong) respond to political interference by foreign governments (e.g.,
China). Although Hong Kong is strictly-speaking not a foreign market in
relation to the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong offers a useful
perspective as an international financial center with many Chinese
businesses’ listings.33
Part II analyzes several types of political interference and the general
impact of foreign actors’ political interference on a company’s governance.
Part II then considers how corporate stakeholders and securities regulators
can respond to political interference. Shifting to focus on China, Part III
examines the Party building movement and its effect upon businesses listed
on the Hong Kong Exchange, measured by the amendments to corporate
constitutions. Following the findings presented in Part III, Part IV explores
regulatory strategies to combat foreign political interference. Part V
concludes by suggesting that regulators should rely on transparency and
market forces to contain foreign political interference.
II. OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, MARKET
REACTIONS AND CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES
This Part provides an overview of foreign political actors interfering
with corporate governance and its effects on stakeholders and firm value.
Utilizing a behavioral perspective, it analyzes the potential responses of
companies and stakeholders to political interference and how companies can
manage such pressure. Finally, this Part examines regulatory responses to
address political interference, including improving transparency and
disclosure, controlling foreign listings through listing requirements, and
changing corporate hierarchies.
A. The Ramifications on Corporate Governance and Firm Value
This Section briefly introduces ways that government actors interfere
with a company, such as state ownership, political connections, regulatory
interventions, and mandating a political institution’s creation, like China’s
32. See infra Part III.B.1.
33. Pursuant to the Hong Kong Exchange, there were 1,241 companies (out of a total of 2,449 listed
in the exchange) that were considered to be Mainland enterprises at the end of 2019. HKEX, HKEX FACT
BOOK 2019 1 (2019), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Market-Data/Statistics/Consol
idated-Reports/HKEX-Fact-Book/HKEX-Fact-Book-2019/FB_2019.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/G35FPLPV].
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Party building requirement. This Section then examines the effects on the
governance and value of listed companies.
1. Types of Political Interference
Political interference takes many forms. A company may interact with
government agencies, politicians, and companies owned by or linked to the
state while conducting business. Those interactions open the door for
government actors to interfere with the governance of a company. For
example, a politician can pressure a company to hire his son when there are
other better candidates for the same position.34 Although external forces
impose pressure, a company may also invite political interference. This
Article refers to invited interference as “internal political interference,” and
uninvited interference as “external political interference.” Although this
Article focuses on uninvited interference, specifically by a foreign
government, some internal political interference aspects are also explored in
this Section.
a. Political Interference Through Equity Ownership
One common form of political interfence is through ownership of
equity stakes in a domestic company by the state.35 For instance, existing
empirical studies show that compliance with Party building reforms36 was
positively correlated with state ownership in China.37
The OECD defines an SOE as “any corporate entity recognized by
national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership.”38
In short, a corporate entity qualifies as an SOE if a state government
exercises effective control of the management of the company.39
Furthermore, different levels of government—such as local, state, and
federal—may control a state enterprise. In China, SOEs may be controlled
by central, provincial, or local governments, creating different SOEs layers.
Sometimes, an SOE is a subsidiary of another state-owned company. For
example, the China Resources Group, a state-owned conglomerate, has
34. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. ECON. 995, 1002 (1994)
[hereinafter Politicians and Firms].
35. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF OECD
COUNTRIES 20–21 (2005).
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See John Zhuang Liu & Angela Huyue Zhang, Ownership and Political Control: Evidence from
Charter Amendments, INT’L REV. L. & ECON., July 31, 2019, at 1, 2; Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate
Governance 21 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 493/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3510342 [https://perma.cc/RMW3-NG4S].
38. GUIDELINES ON STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, supra note 12, at 14.
39. Id. at 14–15.
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multiple subsidiaries in China and Hong Kong, such as China Resources
Land and China Resources Power, which are also SOE’s.40
In addition to a state agency itself owning equity in the company, the
state may also indirectly control an SOE through public or quasi-public
entities. For example, the majority of shares in the Tsinghua Unigroup, a
producer of semiconductors, are owned by Tsinghua Holdings. Tsinghua
Holdings is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tsinghua University, which in
turn is subject to the control of China’s Ministry of Education.41
The state can also establish a stake in a company through a sovereign
wealth fund. A sovereign wealth fund could be generally defined as a stateowned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance
of payments surpluses, foreign exchange reserves, fiscal surpluses or
government transfer payments, etc.42 For instance, the Singaporean
government centralizes its control over certain companies, generally labeled
“government-linked companies,”43 through a wholly-owned sovereign
wealth fund called Temasek Holdings.44 Alternatively, some countries allow
state operators to effectively control a company even if the state holds a
minority interest.45
40. See, e.g., Governance, CHINA RES., http://en.crc.com.cn/investors/governance/ [https://perma
.cc/DM9X-DSUT] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
41. Announcement from Qi Lian, Chairman, Sun East Technology (Holdings) Limited, Grant of
Waiver from Strict Compliance with the Minimum Public Float Requirement (Sept. 2, 2016) (on file with
SINO ICT Holdings Limited) (“Tsinghua Holdings is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tsinghua University,
which is a tertiary education institution directly under the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic
of China.”).
42. See What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?, SWFI, https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/
sovereign-wealth-fund [https://perma.cc/H556-H9WJ] (last visited Dec. 25, 2020).
43. Christopher Chen, Solving the Puzzle of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises:
The Path of the Temasek Model in Singapore and Lessons for China, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 312,
317–19 (2016).
44. See id. at 312–14 (describing the creation of Temasek Holdings, an investment company model,
and noting that although Temasek owned and managed its own investments after having received initial
support from the government, it now only controls twelve of the initial thirty-five companies that
comprised its portofolio); Yvonne C.L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds,
6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197, 229–30 (2010) (comparing Government of Singapore Investment Corp and
Temasek). For more historical perspectives, see generally Tan Cheng-Han et al., State-Owned Enterprises
in Singapore: Historical Insights into a Potential Model for Reform, 28 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 61 (2015)
(analyzing the foundation of Singapore’s successful government-linked companies and to what extent
this model can be applied to China’s reformation of its state-owned enterprises).
45. For example, the Ministry of Finance owned only 12.19% of shares in Changhua Bank, one of
the oldest commercial banks in Taiwan, as of April 2020. See Major Shareholders, CHANG HWA BANK
[hereinafter Major Shareholders], https://www.bankchb.com/frontend/mashup_eng.jsp?funcId=35ebfbf
315 [https://perma.cc/X6GB-GPJ3] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). However, four directors (out of nine) on
the board of the bank are nominees of the government. See Members of the Board of Directors, CHANG
HWA BANK, https://www.bankchb.com/frontend/mashup_eng.jsp?funcId=9b9b580615 [https://perma
.cc/J9X4-DH7P] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). Both the chairman and the chief executive officer are
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Although SOEs are commonly subject to political interference, the
degree of interference vary across countries. For example, Singapore’s
government has exercised substantial self-restraint by not interfering with
the management of government-linked companies.46 In contrast, the Chinese
government has shown more willingness to interfere with corporate
decisions, such as instructing state-owned banks to extend credit to
distressed companies during the global financial crisis in 2008.47 Reports
also emerged that, in 2015, the Chinese government asked state-owned
banks to lend money to traders to prop up the stock market.48 Furthermore,
fourteen of the twenty-five companies listed on China’s new Science and
Technology Innovation Board (“STAR” board) under the Shanghai Stock
Exchange have “state-owned investors among their top three shareholders,”
and state-owned wealth funds dominate trading activity.49 This indicates a
high possibility that the Chinese government used state ownership to
influence a company’s decision to list on the new STAR board (instead of
other stock markets) or bought the shares of these companies for policy
reasons, including propping up the new stock market. Moreover, a state’s
willingness to control a company may also depend on the industry. In
Taiwan, utility companies—e.g., electricity and water suppliers—remain
firmly controlled by the government, whereas SOEs in other industries—
e.g., banking—have been privatized since the late 1980s.50
b. Political Interference through Other Means
Political interference may also manifest through political connections,
regulatory authority or simply political power held by a politician or political
party. If a government or a politician has an appointee in a company’s board
or management—e.g. as a nominee director or a well-known politician’s
son—the government or politician can influence a company’s governance

nominees of the Ministry of Finance which also appointed the Director General of National Treasury
Administration onto the board as a non-executive director. Id. In essence, the Ministry of Finance has
effective control over the management of bank, despite holding only 12.19% of shares. Major
Shareholders, supra note 45.
46. Chen, supra note 43, at 365.
47. See Giant Reality-Check, supra note 13.
48. Gabriel Wildau, China’s Biggest State Banks Recruited into Stock Market Rescue, FIN. TIMES
(July 17, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/c30b6f3a-2c3d-11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7 [https://perma.cc/
7ECV-RZXP].
49. Tom Hancock & Wang Xueqiao, State-Owned Investors Dominate China’s New Tech
Exchange, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/87dd12b2-ba85-11e9-8a88aa6628ac896c [https://perma.cc/Y8A4-WUGU].
50. Huei-Wen Pao et al., The Road to Liberalization: Policy Design and Implementation of
Taiwan’s Privatization, 5 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y 323, 334–36 (2008).
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and decisions. Nevertheless, the extent of influence depends on the
relationship between politically connected persons and the company.
Political interference can be exercised through regulations, especially
highly regulated industries.51 A bank might need approval to appoint a chief
executive officer. A politician who wants to influence the bank may instruct
a relevant regulator to delay approval until the bank complies with political
demands. Similar interference could occur if a business requires a license or
permit—e.g., a construction permit to develop a site. This power is apparent
in highly regulated industries, such as banks or telecommunication firms,
where companies frequently interact with regulators.
In addition, companies are subject to overt political interference by a
politician or a political party due to the politician or political party’s
dominant power in a country. For example, as elaborated below, China’s
Party building movement has attempted to formalize the CCP’s presence
within companies.52 The CCP has thereby written itself into companies’
governance structure,53 even where the Party lacks an equity stake.
2. The Pros and Cons of Political Interference on Companies
Political interference can benefit companies. However, interference,
whether invited or not, can harm a company and its value. This Section first
considers invited political interference, through the lens of political
connections, and then examines costs of other forms of external political
interference.
Political connections offer both economic and noneconomic benefits to
a company. For example, political connections can increase the likelihood of
acquiring government contracts or favorable loans from state-owned
banks.54 Companies may also have better access to international sources of
funds.55 Well-connected companies are more likely to be bailed out when
international institutions, like the World Bank, provide financial assistance
to a national government.56 In China, politically connected banks are more
likely to lend to politically connected companies, which are, in turn, more

51. See Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 1015.
52. Before the political movement, some companies already had CCP organizations, but their
presence was not officially recognized in the companies’ constitutions. See infra Part III.A.
53. Hughes, supra note 31.
54. Agyenim Boateng et al., Politically Connected Boards, Ownership Structure and Credit Risk:
Evidence from Chinese Commercial Banks, 47 RSCH. INT’L BUS. & FIN. 162, 164–65 (2019).
55. See Shujun Ding et al., Political Connections and Agency Conflicts: The Roles of Owner and
Manager Political Influence on Executive Compensation, 45 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 407, 408
(2015).
56. Mara Faccio et al., Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597, 2597, 2617
(2006).
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likely to be bailed out in an economic crisis.57 Notably, politically connected
executives receive more compensation from non-state-owned companies
than from state-owned companies.58 The difference suggests that non-stateowned companies offer more rewards for political connections.59
In addition to benefits to the company, the state may benefit from
political connections. The Chinese government has a strong interest in
Alibaba, an e-commerce giant, because government agencies use its
platforms to conduct billions of dollars of transactions.60 A politicallyconnected appointee may restrain management’s conduct by acting as
unofficial government oversight. External oversight may force managers “to
cut wages and bonuses when enterprise performance is poor.”61 The benefits
of political connections are not limited to less developed or more corrupt
countries. Political connections provide corporate rent-seeking even in a
low-corruption environment.62 Although political connections can be
useful,63 quantifying the value of such connections may be challenging.64
Despite the benefits brought by political connections, even invited
interference can harm a company. A politically connected chief executive
officer is found to be more likely to implement strategic initiatives and credit
policies that favor the government than a less connected officer.
Implementing those initiatives or policies would in turn increase the risk of
default for Chinese banks.65 Comparing forty-seven countries, companies
with political connections were found to possess higher leverage, more
substantial market power, but performed worse than non-connected

57. Chi-Hsiou D. Hung et al., Bank Political Connections and Performance in China, 32 J. FIN.
STABILITY 57, 57, 67 (2017).
58. Ding et al., supra note 55, at 407, 429–30.
59. See id.
60. Jay Somaney, Chinese Government Has a Huge “Stake” in Alibaba, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2015,
6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysomaney/2015/10/18/chinese-government-has-a-hugestake-in-alibaba/?sh=23bf93a125b8 [https://perma.cc/8SJT-88PN]. Alibaba’s platforms include the likes
of Taobao and Tmall. Id.
61. Eric C. Chang & Sonia M.L. Wong, Political Control and Performance in China’s Listed
Firms, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 617, 620 (2004).
62. Mario Daniele Amore & Morten Bennedsen, The Value of Local Political Connections in a
Low-Corruption Environment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 387, 387, 401 (2013).
63. Raymond Fisman, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1095,
1095–96 (2001).
64. See id. at 1095 (“The claim was that in Southeast Asia, political connectedness, rather than
fundamentals such as productivity, was the primary determinant of profitability and that this had led to
distorted investment decisions. . . . However investigations in this area have not progressed beyond the
level of case study and anecdote. That is, there has been no attempt to estimate the degree to which firms
rely on connections for their profitability.”).
65. Boateng et al., supra note 54, at 171.
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companies.66 The difference in financial performance between politically
connected and non-connected companies depend on a country’s economic
development and corruption.67 For instance, “[c]ountries that are richer,
more democratic, and have free press have more disclosure [by
politicians].”68 It was also found that “[p]ublic disclosure . . . is positively
related to government quality, including lower corruption.”69
Other than the benefits that political connection offers companies, it is
widely argued that political interference generally harms companies’ value.
First, political interference in a company’s governance increases agency
costs.70 It is taken for granted that those who exercise political interference
reap some personal benefits, such as patronage hiring or procuring goods.71
Government officials may pursue their political objectives at the expense of
company shareholders.72 To illustrate, if managers’ incentives come from
their political interests, rather than their business acumen, they may promote
their careers at the expense of the company. This reflects the common
perception that SOEs are improperly managed and less efficient than their
private counterparts.73 In many countries, state-owned banks increase their
lending in election years.74 In some cases, political interference could be a
form of corruption. In China, political interference by local Party committees
was associated with negative firm performance, and such a negative impact
on firm value outweighs any reduction in managerial agency costs, e.g., by
restraining largest shareholders from expropriation.75
Second, issues of accountability arise when government actors interfere
with a company’s governance while lacking any legal obligations to its

66. Mara Faccio, Differences Between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A CrossCountry Analysis, 39 FIN. MGMT. 905, 906 (2010).
67. Id. at 905.
68. Simeon Djankov et al., Disclosure by Politicians, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 179, 179
(2010).
69. Id.
70. See generally Ross, supra note 7 (presenting a short summary of the economic theory of agency
and a discussion of the factors that influence agent behavior, such as fee schedules and the distribution of
information between the principal and the agent); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8 (offering a fuller
discussion of the economic theory of agent behavior by listing the types of agency costs and how the
principal’s use of monitoring and incentives can affect such costs).
71. Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 995–96.
72. Joseph P. H. Fan et al., Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned
Corporate Pyramids, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1217, 1221–22 (2012).
73. OECD, PRIVATISING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICIES AND
PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 20 (2003).
74. I. Serdar Dinç, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in
Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 453, 475–76 (2005).
75. Chang & Wong, supra note 61, at 617.

CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

INTERFERENCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES

5/27/2021 10:16 PM

315

shareholders. In many common law countries76 and China77, directors and
some senior management, owe a fiduciary duty to the company. When a
political actor is not a director or lacks an official role within the company,
they also lack any legal responsibility for their conduct—e.g., a poor
management decision—even if it results in loss.
Third, divergent views between stakeholders and external actors may
lead to a conflict of interest.78 As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government
requested that state-owned banks extend credit to SOEs during the global
financial crisis. The interference over the bank’s decisions was for the state’s
interests—i.e., to prop up the economy—but not necessarily aligned with the
banks’ or their shareholders’ interests because higher non-performing loans
might hurt the bank’s value.79 In this situation, there is a conflict of interests
between the state’s interests and the interests of the company. Minority
investors are likely to suffer when the government actor enjoys power
disproportionate to its interests in the company.80 In addition, there could be
an inherent conflict of interest from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and
regulator.81 On the one hand, state’s exercise of regulatory power—e.g.
applying fines for pollution—increases costs and reduces profits of an SOE;
on the other, if the state decides not to exercise regulatory power because it
might hurt the value of the state’s equity stakes in a company,it could be
detrimental to the society, e.g., for environmental protection.
Even the state owner can tunnel at the expense of shareholders. Through
political pressure, the state can induce a company to serve their objectives.82
These actions may be done in the name of some public interest, like reducing
unemployment or managing labor relations. However, such gains are usually
at the expense of the company—e.g., hiring unsuitable or unnecessary

76. See Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 425 (UK) (explaining that directors are trustees of the
company and must act in the company’s best interests when disposing of its shares).
77. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27,
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 147, 148, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685
&lib=law [https://perma.cc/5UWE-TGYX].
78. Zhang, supra note 21, at 59–60.
79. See Giant Reality-Check, supra note 13.
80. Zhang, supra note 21, at 59; Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin, Institutionalizing Political Influence in
Business: Managerial Resistance and Insider Control, 45 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
at 1) (on file with author).
81. Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917,
2919 (2012).
82. This has been described as a “grabbing hand,” a term coined by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W.
Vishny. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998) (using “grabbing hand” as a term to describe the imposition of
predatory policies, such as arbitrary taxes, by public sector institutions).
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employees—and could, therefore, damage the company’s value.83 The
problem may be heightened if an SOE is wholly or partially privatized but
remains heavily regulated.84 In this situation, the company has private
investors but continues to be exposed to the same degree of political
interference. Arguably, SOEs’ related-party transactions (i.e. transactions
with connected persons of the company) may decrease social welfare when
the state attempts to prop up SOEs with benefits that are otherwise
unavailable to private enterprises.85
In addition, political interference could result in poor management and
financial performance. A study found that having more political connections
hampered an SOE’s globalization efforts.86 In Taiwan, companies with
robust corporate governance focused less on building political connections,
and politically connected companies were likely to demonstrate poor
corporate governance.87 Similarly, politically connected financial
institutions in the United States have higher leverage levels and greater
volatility that exposes financial institutions to higher financial risk than their
non-politically connected counterparts.88
In sum, companies can benefit from their political connections.
However, external political interference can harm corporate governance and
reduce a company’s value. Understanding the costs and benefits of political
interference, the following sections analyze stakeholders’ reactions to
external political interference. It then explores possible responses for
securities regulators or stock market operators.
B. A Behavioral Analysis of Reactions to External Political Interference
Managers’ and stakeholders’ responses determine the effectiveness of
external interference and inform how host market regulators curb such
interference. This Section explores the possible reactions of corporate
83. See generally Yingyi Qian, Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political
Control, 4 ECON. TRANSITION 427 (1996) (discussing how the allocation of control rights between
managers and the government leads to political and agency costs for SOEs).
84. Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 1015.
85. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and Policy
Channeling 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 386/2018, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119164 [https://perma.cc/9DAV-WX9D].
86. Hao Liang et al., An Anatomy of State Control in the Globalization of State-Owned Enterprises,
46 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 223, 223 (2015).
87. Chung-Hua Shen et al., Do Strong Corporate Governance Firms Still Require Political
Connection, and Vice Versa?, 39 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 107, 118 (2015).
88. See generally Leonard Kostovetsky, Political Capital and Moral Hazard, 116 J. FIN. ECON.
144, 144 (2015) (“[P]rior to the 2008 financial crisis, politically-connected financial firms had higher
leverage and were more likely to increase their leverage . . . . which was associated with worse
performance . . .”).
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stakeholders including managers, current shareholders, and prospective
investors. This Article posits that corporate stakeholders should object to
external political interference unless they can gain personally from such
interference. If they provide sufficient opposition, the effect of political
interference could be avoided or compromised to some extent. Corporate
stakeholders’ responses and their effectiveness in curbing political
interference then determine how regulators should respond to foreign
political interference.
First, companies’ managers generally resist political interference by
external actors unless a manager has political connections. Irrespective of
whether a company is a private enterprise or SOE, interference affects
managerial discretion. Restrictions on managerial discretion could affect the
company’s performance and value. For example, Chinese companies “tend
to perform better when managers have flexibility in labor deployment.”89
Hence, managers should prefer more flexibility in managerial discretion and
reduce the influence of politicians.
Moreover, even managers of SOEs are expected to resist external
political interference. In addition to reduced managerial discretion, external
political interference provides additional oversight90 that managers may not
like. Without additional oversight, managers of an SOE would enjoy
significant discretion over state assets and benefit from on-the-job
consumption and perks.91 Consequently, even the managers of an SOE have
incentives to resist political interference.
However, the effectiveness of SOE managers’ resistance to political
interference depends on the control exerted by a government. The stronger
the control, the more likely an SOE is subject to direct political interference.
In contrast, if a company is more remote from the source of political
influence, this might lessen the power of political interference, and managers
are more likely to object to it. For example, an SOE’s management is subject
to more direct political pressure if the government is a controlling
shareholder. In contrast, a company’s lower position in the corporate
pyramid indicates a higher chance of resisting or being immune from
political interference from external political interference through the state

89. Lixin Colin Xu et al., Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence
from China, in THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN CHINA 199, 216 (Shuanglin Lin & Shunfeng
Song eds., 2007).
90. For example, one example of extra oversight by a political entity is the CCP’s imposition of a
disciplinary committee on the company. See infra Part III.A.
91. Yingyi Qian, Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: INSIDER CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF BANKS 215, 222
(Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995).
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owner.92 The reason is that the instructions of an ultimate state owner (i.e.,
the controlling shareholder of the parent SOE) are not necessarily enforced
down a corporate pyramid structure. Therefore, an SOE experiences less
pressure when the company is a subsidiary, or even a subsidiary of a
subsidiary, of another state-owned company, resulting in higher managerial
discretion. In other words, SOEs in which the managers enjoy greater
autonomy are more likely to resist harmful political interference if managers
think it hurts the company.93
Managers’ responses to external political interference also differ
depending on the source of influence. For example, suppose the controlling
owner of an SOE is the Ministry of Finance. In that case, the company is
more likely to respond more forcibly to political interference by the finance
minister or the prime minister than to interference exercised by a local city
councilor in the rural area. Similarly, SOE managers closer to Beijing are
more likely to follow instructions from the CCP’s leaders or by the central
government, given their vicinity in terms of connection to the center of
political power and geographical distance. Thus, it is reasonable to expect
that SOEs in which the managers enjoy greater autonomy are more likely to
resist political interference.94
Second, the divergence of interests among shareholders also
complicates a company’s response to political interference. Non-state
shareholders generally object to political interference because it reduces the
company’s value and, hence, their investment’s value.95 However, non-state
shareholders may not object when interference benefits them individually or
the company. For shareholders who are the state or government agency, their
responses depend on the owner’s nature and the political environment.
Third, prospective investors, similar to minority shareholders, are more
likely to object to external political interference. For investors in the equity
market, a collective adverse reaction could result in either a downward price
movement in the stock market or undervaluation of a companies’ share
prices. A company’s financing costs might increase when issuing new shares
or bonds. If the share price becomes too low, it increases the likelihood of a
prospective investor’s takeover. The possibility of competition for corporate
control may constrain management’s willingness to accept external political
interference.96 Therefore, if the possibility of a hostile takeover is real,
92. Fan et al., supra note 72, at 1221.
93. Lin, supra note 80, at 35. Lin, supra note 80, at 35.
94. Id.
95. See supra Part II.A.
96. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965) (demonstrating an active market for control of corporations by examining various

CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

INTERFERENCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES

5/27/2021 10:16 PM

319

managers are less likely to accept external political interference that may hurt
the company’s value.
The diversity of views held by corporate stakeholders create dynamic
interactions. Their interests shape how a company, as a whole, responds to
political interference. This Article argues that shareholders, prospective
investors, and corporate management are more likely to resist external
political interference unless they have something to gain. Their responses
impact the effectiveness of political interference. If together, corporate
stakeholders provide strong enough resistance, external political interference
should not be effective, and its negative impact on firm value could be
avoided or reduced. If this is the case, the market can provide the power to
deter or curtail the effect of external political interference.
C. Response Strategies by Securities Regulators
This Section examines response strategies that securities regulators
might adopt when listed companies in the stock market face foreign political
interference. This Section first illustrates challenges to securities regulators
if political interference comes from domestic sources and examines the
difficulties of dealing with foreign political interference after a company’s
listing. This Section then presents three possible options: strengthening
market power through transparency, greater control through listing
requirements, and forcing companies to change corporate structures. In the
end, this Article argues that strengthening market power through a higher
degree of transparency to help corporate stakeholders to resist foreign
political interference is the better approach.
When interference comes from domestic sources, securities regulators’
responses will depend on the domestic government’s politics, institutional
structure, and power balance. A regulator’s ability to issue regulations, for
example, might do little to inhibit interference. For instance, when the CCP
issued instructions to incorporate Party building into corporate constitutions,
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) followed up by adding
them into the code of corporate governance. 97 Given the CCP’s dominance,98
the CSRC could not address the Chinese government’s political interference.
antitrust and economic implications of competition and mergers on shareholders and management); David
Scharfstein, The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185 (1988) (analyzing how
takeover threats, when used as a means of creating capital market competition, play a role in disciplining
management).
97. China Corporate Governance Code, supra note 29.
98. China Anniversary: How the Communist Party Runs the Country, BBC (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49631120 [https://perma.cc/82QX-8DTJ]; Christina Zhou,
China’s Communist Party is at a Fatal Age for One-Party Regimes. How Much Longer Can It Survive?,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-05/chinas-communist-party-
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Securities regulators face a different kind of challenge with foreign
political interference. First, the response of a securities regulator depends to
some extent on the relationship between the countries where the regulator is
and where political interference originates. For example, regulators in a
larger market, like the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United
States, have more power to deal with foreign political interference than
regulators in smaller markets like Singapore or regulators in a subordinated
jurisdiction like Hong Kong. Second, market conditions affect responses to
foreign political interference. Larger stock exchanges with a deeper pool of
listed companies like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the
NASDAQ may be more likely than their smaller peers to impose listing or
conduct requirements based on undesirable political interference. As the
largest stock exchanges in the world, according to market capitalization,99
the NYSE and NASDAQ have more ability to either filter companies who
want to list or force compliance with their requests. Companies may not want
to endanger their successful initial public offerings (IPOs) or secondary
listings in the U.S. capital market for financial, reputational, or other
concerns. Consequently, the market restrains political interference, at least
seemingly.
Market conditions can also adversely affect how regulators perceive
foreign political interference, especially in a smaller country. For example,
neither Singapore nor Hong Kong possesses the political leverage to bargain
with the Chinese government. Hong Kong is administered as a special
administrative region under the PRC.100 Although politically distinct and
farther away, Singapore is a smaller country that relies on trade and financial

is-at-a-fatal-age-for-one-party-regimes/11807138 [https://perma.cc/GX5V-AYMD]; Ming Xia, The
Communist Party of China and the “Party-State,” N.Y. TIMES, https://archive.nytimes.com/
www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-002.html [https://perma.cc/CVQ2-8EE9] (last visited
Mar. 7, 2021).
99. See, e.g., Becca Cattlin, What are the Largest Stock Exchanges in the World?, IG (Mar. 12,
2019, 11:01 AM) https://www.ig.com/au/trading-strategies/what-are-the-largest-stock-exchanges-in-theworld—180905 [https://perma.cc/WE8Z-VLTD]; Rolando Y. Wee, Biggest Stock Exchanges in the
World, WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-stock-exchanges-inthe-world.html [https://perma.cc/D6PP-2FMY].
100. See The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3572_665469/t17814.shtml [https://perm
a.cc/Z98H-6UL9] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). Since Great Britain handed over Hong Kong to the People’s
Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong has been treated as a “special administrative region” in China,
enjoying some degree of autonomy based on Hong Kong’s Basic Law, including using its own laws and
courts. Id. However, Hong Kong is not an independent country. See id. Some international organizations
list Hong Kong as “Hong Kong, China.” See id. (explaining that Hong Kong may join the World Trade
Organization, other international organizations and international trade agreements under the name “Hong
Kong, China”).
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services with Chinese businesses to support its economy.101 Due to heavy
competition for listings, Hong Kong and Singapore governments are likely
to welcome Chinese companies, despite the political interference associated
with Chinese companies. With the rise of Chinese technology giants like
Alibaba and Tencent, both Singapore and Hong Kong have allowed the
listing of companies with dual-class shares102 to attract more high-rise
Chinese companies.103
Before a company is listed on a stock exchange, regulators can prevent
political interference ex ante by rejecting the company’s listing if there are
concerns over foreign political interference. For example, the Holding
Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) requires that foreign issuers,
who retain a non-inspected, registered public accounting firm in a foreign
jurisdiction, establish that they are not owned or controlled by a foreign
government.104 If the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB)105 cannot inspect a foreign public accounting firm for three
consecutive years, the foreign issuer will be banned from listing their shares
on U.S. securities exchanges.106
101. Per the Singapore government’s statistics for 2017, finance and insurance services accounted
for 13.3% of Singapore’s gross domestic product, while wholesale and retail trade accounted for 17.6%
of the gross domestic product. SING. DEP’T OF STATISTICS, SINGAPORE IN FIGURES 2018, at 9 (2018),
https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/publications/reference/sif2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EQU-W
DPF].
102. In a typical dual-class shares structure, a company’s equity is divided into multiple classes of
shares with one class entitling holders to multiple voting rights and another class sold to public investors
with one vote per share. Holders of the former class are usually the company’s founders and executives.
Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Theory, Evidence, and Policy on Dual-Class Shares: A Country-Specific
Response to a Global Debate 5 (Ibero-Am. Inst. for Law & Fin., Working Paper 3/2019, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397880 [https://perma.cc/9N5N-H93Z]. There are academic debates as
to whether the dual-class shares structure hurts firm value and corporate governance. See generally Mara
Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON.
365, 384–93 (2002) (explaining how dual-class shares can be a control enhancing mechanism that creates
significant disparities between the control and ownership of a firm); Ting Li & Nataliya Zaiats, Corporate
Governance and Firm Value at Dual Class Firms, 36 REV. FIN. ECON. 47, 67–68 (2018) (finding that
dual-class firms are more likely to employ increased shareholder rights provisions and those rights are
often not significantly associated with firm value).
103. Hong Kong and Singapore Succumb to the Lure of Dual-Class Shares, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/01/hong-kong-and-singapore-succ
umb-to-the-lure-of-dual-class-shares [https://perma.cc/39EN-HJCX].
104. Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214(i)(2) (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 116-222).
105. Created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the PCAOB was a non-profit corporation
established by the Congress of the United States to oversee the audit of public companies in order to
protect investors and public interests. About, PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD.,
https://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-PXGP] (last visited Feb. 26,
2021).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 7214(i)(3). The Trump administration issued a set of recommendations in July
2020 to implement the bill and give existing issuers a transition period until January 1, 2022. Soyoung
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However, a regulator’s options are limited when a company has already
been listed. This Article specifically considers three options to deal with
interference: bolstering transparency requirements to assist corporate
stakeholders to respond to foreign political interference, imposing more
stringent listing standards to force companies out of the market, or
prescribing a company to change its corporate structure to immunize it from
external political interference. This Article discusses each in turn.
1. Strengthening Corporate Stakeholders through Transparency
Securities regulators could bolster available information by
strengthening disclosure requirements regarding foreign political
interference. By requiring disclosure of material information or notices to
shareholders, informed stakeholders can better respond to the nature and
scope of political interference. In other words, this is a relatively nonintrusive approach. By providing relevant information public, the market
price can reflect the information and the extent of political interference. It
then can generate market forces to restrain a company’s responses to foreign
political interference.
Disclosure empowers the market to correct for political interference. If
a company’s share price falls, the market sends a signal to other market
participants to self-correct. A lower valuation of the company’s shares could
incentivize managers to resist interference to reduce further devaluation. If
the market’s response sufficiently damages the company, the management
and shareholders might resist the interference. If this is the case, the costs of
interference could be contained. Alternatively, a lower valuation might invite
market participants to acquire a larger stake in the company or compete for
control. Corporate managers would thus be incentivized to avoid political
interference to reduce the chance of a potential takeover by another person
or entity unless they are political appointees. Regulators can create an
environment, through disclosure requirements, where the market effectively
corrects for potential interference.
However, there are also limitations to the effectiveness of disclosure
and the market’s power. First, there has been considerable debate on the
market’s ability to absorb information.107 Information regarding alleged
interference may be unclear. For example, disclosure requirements may not
reach informal conversations, such as state officials requesting that managers
Ho, Trump Administration Seeks to Delist U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies for Blocking Audit Inspections,
THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2020), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/trump-administration-seeksto-delist-u-s-listed-chinese-companies-for-blocking-audit-inspections [https://perma.cc/TH2H-JJ5L].
107. See generally EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE:
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 45–56 (2005) (discussing the history and criticism of the
assumptions underlying the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model).
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of a state-owned bank maintain credit lines. Likewise, notice may be given
regarding the appointment of a new chairman, but the reason for the
appointment may be excluded. This limits the effectiveness of disclosure
requirements and, consequently, the market’s ability to respond to political
interference adequately.
Second, the market for corporate control might not exist, so that the
chance of being taken over by a third party is low. Some countries may deter
takeovers for policy reasons, like bolstering “national champions” or
protecting local industries.108 The degree of concentrated ownership and the
nature of the controlling owner would also impact the takeover market’s
effectiveness.109 Also, assuming that such a market exists, it is still
questionable whether it effectively reduces agency problems.110 In many
countries, hostile takeovers are virtually non-existent. Moreover, the market
for corporate control of an SOE is less likely if the state is unwilling to sell
their positions. These entrenched positions could prevent any takeover of an
SOE by an outsider, although that SOE might bid to take over other
companies.111 In this situation, market pressures may be inadequate to
control external political interference.
2. Greater Control Through Listing Requirements
Securities regulators can directly address foreign political interference
through listing requirements. Once a company is already listed, addressing
foreign political interference through warnings, suspensions, or delisting
may not be effective or could detrimentally affect shareholders’ interests.112
Host market regulators have little power to enforce rules against a foreign
government. For example, the Securities Exchange Commission is unlikely
to acquire a court order to stop the CCP from setting up Party organizations
when that company’s headquarters and assets are in China.
Furthermore, although suspending trading or delisting could remove
foreign interference from the market, they are draconian measures that could
adversely affect the overall market. Minority shareholders will suffer if they
108. Paul Davies et al., Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 205, 240 (3d ed. 2017).
109. See id.
110. See Charlie Weir, The Market for Corporate Control, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 328, 338–39 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that the predominance
of non-hostile takeovers raises questions about whether the market for corporate control is an effective
mechanism for disciplining corporations).
111. See, e.g., Chiara D. Del Bo et al., Governments in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence
from M&A Deals Involving State-Owned Enterprises, 45 J. COMP. ECON. 89, 90 (2017).
112. For example, under U.S. law, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to
suspend the trading of a security if, in the Commission’s opinion, the suspension is in the public interest
and necessary to protect investors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(k).
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cannot cash out their shareholdings after a trading suspension or mandatory
delisting due to an event (i.e., political interference) beyond their control.
Securities regulators would also have to weigh draconian measures against
the costs of losing listings in stock exchanges if companies that are exposed
to foreign political interference decide to avoid the U.S. market and list
elsewhere.
3. Changing Corporate Structure to Immunize the Company
Securities regulators could require changes in corporate structures to
place a company in the lower level of a corporate pyramid to shield
companies from political pressure. A study found that intervening layers of
corporate hierarchies empowered managers by distancing them from direct
political pressure, and the Chinese government built corporate pyramids (i.e.,
a corporate group with layers of holding companies and subsidiaries in its
vertical structure) to insulate managers from political interference, despite
the risk of increased agency costs.113 Hence, to ensure that managers are
more empowered to resist political interference, it is arguable that a company
should be allowed to be listed if it is in the lower part of a corporate pyramid.
However, this approach is also counter-intuitive. On the one hand, securities
regulators generally prefer transparency and accountability in the corporate
structure. Being in the lower level of a corporate pyramid hardly improves
transparency. On the other hand, a complicated corporate structure may also
interfere with effective monitoring over the management’s conduct.
Therefore, this Article does not prefer this approach.
4. Summary
Securities regulators must decide which approach most efficiently
counters foreign political interference. In an open market with powerful
institutional investors, promoting transparency and disclosure could
efficiently curb foreign political interference. Greater transparency can
empower managers, shareholders, and prospective investors to decide what
is best for the company in light of foreign political interference. In other
words, this Article proposes a market-driven approach to deal with foreign
political interference. The approach is preferred to suspension or mandatory
delisting, as the latter hurts shareholders’ interests. However, the marketdriven approach’s effectiveness depends on whether corporate stakeholders
could respond to foreign political interference, as the Article predicts. The
next Part explores how Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong responded
to the CCP’s Party building movement.

113. Fan et al., supra note 72, at 1219.
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III. PARTY BUILDING IN HONG KONG
This Part explores political interference by a foreign actor through the
CCP’s Party Building requirement in China. Section A examines three kinds
of Party building provisions: organizational, management, and human
resources. Section B uses the rate of adoption as a measure of compliance
with external political interference. Overall, their response demonstrates
compliance with political interference, illustrated by the requirements
imposed from the CCP of relevant Party building provisions. Section C then
examines Hong Kong’s reaction to that political interference by observing
share prices. Section D summarizes the findings present.
A. Understanding Party Building
The CCP is writing itself into the country’s largest companies’
corporate constitutions, which this Article refers to as the “Party building”
movement. In January 2017, the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council and the CCP
Central Organization Department jointly issued an official notice asking
SOEs to incorporate Party building provisions into their corporate
constitutions, including their sample provisions.114 The Party building
movement then extends from SOEs to private enterprises.115 In short,
Chinese companies must formalize the CCP’s role in the company by
recognizing the CCP’s party organization and power in their corporate
constitutions. “While the new language makes explicit investors’ long-held
assumption of party influence, the changes are the first time the party rather
than the government has been named, investors said.”116
This Article classifies Party building provisions into three categories:
(1) general provisions establishing the CCP’s role in the company
(“organizational interference”); (2) provisions that give the CCP a role in
management decisions (“management interference”); and (3) provisions that
grant the CCP control over management or human resources personnel

114. Guanyu Zhashi Tuidong Guoyou Qiye Dangjian Gongzuo Yaoqiu Xieru Gongsi Zhangcheng
de Tongzhi (关于扎实推动国有企业党建工作要求写入公司章程的通知) [Notice Regarding the
Promotion of the Requirements of Incorporation of Party Building Work into the Articles of Associations
of State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t of the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese
Communist Party & the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n of the State Council, Mar.
15, 2017, effective Mar. 16, 2017), Zu Tong Zi (组通字) [2017] No. 11, [hereinafter Requirements of
Incorporation of Party Building Work], https://jzb.zju.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/38/38/dbe8ec
03469692297d7dcc27ec95/7158a359-54f9-4543-a7f4-fdcab818d633.pdf [https://perma.cc/2829-6U9Z]
(China).
115. See Hornby, supra note 27.
116. Hughes, supra note 31.
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(“human resources interference”).117 This Section elaborates on each
category in more detail below.
First, organizational interference requires a company’s constitution to
formally introduce the CCP’s Party organization as an organ of the company.
Before Party building, a company might informally have a Party
organization inside the company.118 However, the CCP’s Party building
campaign requires a company to formalize its existence in its constitution.
There could be several forms of organizational interference. A company’s
constitution can state that it will follow the “Constitution of the Communist
Party of China.”119 More importantly, a company’s constitution must
expressly create a Party organization, or Party committee, as a company
organ alongside the board of directors and shareholders.120 The Party
committee is expected to exercise “the core leadership role, providing
direction, managing the overall situation and ensuring implementation [of
CCP’s policies].”121 Through those provisions, the CCP establishes itself
inside a company to lead the company and ensure that it will follow the
CCP’s instructions. In addition to creating the Party committee, a company

117. We use the phrase “management interference” in the same way Liu and Zhang use the phrase
“decision-making control;” and use “human resources interference” in the same way Liu and Zhang use
“personnel control.” Liu & Zhang, supra note 37, at 8.
118. Zhang, supra note 21, at 56.
119. E.g., Zhongguo Guoji Hangkong Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhangcheng (中国国际航空股份有
限公司章程) [Articles of Incorporation of Air China Limited], Air China, art. 11 (Oct. 19, 2018),
http://www.airchina.com.cn/cn/images/investor_relations/%E5%9B%BD%E8%88%AA%E8%82%A1
%E4%BB%BD%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8%E7%AB%A0%E7%A8%8B(2018.10.19%E4%BF%AE
%E8%AE%A2%E7%89%88).pdf [https://perma.cc/R9Y6-N3ED], translated in Articles of Association
of Air China Limited, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Air China (2018)], https://markets.ft.com/
data/announce/full?dockey=1323-13836412-0UEHL36DSUMC7N01048PBFPN16 [https://perma.cc/
XYK4-BRXJ]; Zhongguo Tiejian Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhangcheng (中国铁建股份有限公司章程)
[Articles of Incorporation of China Railway Construction Corporation Limited], China Ry. Constr. Corp.,
art. 1 (June 11, 2018), http://www.crcc.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=2b527
9493c084a87b6a744b716b61ac0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QVE-JBM5], translated in Articles of
Association of China Railway Construction Corporation Limited, HKEX [hereinafter China Railway
Construction Corp. (2018)], https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/1218/2019121
801017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K7U-GG8T] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); Zhongguo Gongshang Yinhang
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhangcheng (中国工商银行股份有限公司章程) [Articles of Incorporation of
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China], Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, art. 13 (Sept. 25, 2017),
http://v.icbc.com.cn/userfiles/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2017/gszc_cn.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN5
H-33A9], translated in Articles of Association of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited,
ICBC [hereinafter ICBC (2017)], http://v.icbc.com.cn/userfiles/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2017/
gszc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7FK-TTBF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
120. E.g., Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 11; China Railway Construction Corp. (2018),
supra note 119, art. 247; ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 13.
121. ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 13. See also Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 11 (“The
Party committee shall perform the core leading and political functions, control the directions, manage the
situation and ensure the implementation.”).
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is also obligated to provide “sufficient personnel to handle Party affairs
and . . . sufficient funds to operate.”122 In short, the CCP can use the
company’s resources to sponsor its Party organization.
The CCP can also strengthen its grip on a company’s organizational
structure through a disciplinary inspection committee.123 The CCP
disciplinary inspection committee serves as the CCP’s anti-corruption
enforcement agency and Party rules.124 A company manager could be subject
to the Party’s investigation or penalties for violation of Party disciplines.
Therefore, the presence of a disciplinary inspection committee greatly
enhances the CCP’s power to interfere with a company’s governance
through the Party’s disciplinary actions. Additionally, the appointment of a
full-time deputy secretary allows the CCP to maintain a constant presence
within the company to, for example, monitor management. Deputysecretaries are also responsible for the implementation of CCP policies and
instructions within the company.125 Thus, the presence of a full-time deputy
secretary should enhance the CCP’s grip on a company.
Second, provisions regarding management interference require that
managerial decisions comply with CCP policies. By interfering with
management decisions, it reduces the management’s discretion in governing
the company. For example, one common provision requires that the “board
of directors shall make inquiries with the Party committee before making
decisions on major issues of the Company.”126 In another example, a
company’s constitution that “the President shall hear the opinion of the Party
Committee of the Company before he hosts the office meeting to discuss and
decide on material issues in relation to the production, operation and
management of the Company.”127 By requiring the board of directors or
managers to solicit the Party organization’s opinions before making a
material decision, the CCP interferes with the company’s management
decisions. Such interference could reduce a company’s value if the CCP’s
interests are not aligned with its overall interest. If management and Party
122. Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 11. See also ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 13 (“The
working organs of the Party shall be established, equipped with sufficient staff to deal with Party affairs
and provided with sufficient funds to operate the Party organization.”).
123. E.g., ICBC (2017), supra note 119, arts. 52–53.
124. Guo Yong, The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission
in the Reform Era, 12 CHINA REV. 1, 2 (2012).
125. E.g., Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 106; ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 52.
126. Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 113. See also China Railway Construction Corp. (2018),
supra note 119, art. 166 (“The Board shall hear the opinions of the Party Committee of the Company
before making decisions on material issues of the Company.”); ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 144
(“The opinions of the Party Committee shall be heard before the board of directors decides on material
issues of the Bank.”).
127. China Railway Construction Corp. (2018), supra note 119, art. 202.
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officials disagree on a matter, presumably, the management should follow
the CCP’s instruction, even if it is not for the company’s best interests (e.g.,
lending money to an SOE to prop up the latter’s finance). Otherwise, a
manager is exposed to the risk that he might be subject to the CCP’s
disciplinary actions or other penalties by the CCP (e.g., no promotion in the
future). Thus, it may affect how managers make decisions for the company’s
best interests if they know the CCP monitors them.
Finally, the CCP can also interfere with human resources decisions. In
addition to having Party organization and requiring the management to
consult the CCP before a management decision, another way to insert the
CCP’s role in a company is by requiring most senior managers to be Party
members or serving in the Party organizations. The CCP could also interfere
with the promotion of a company’s managers or employees and ensure that
they follow the CCP’s policies and instructions. For example, the
constitution of the International and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), one
of the largest banks in the world,128 specifies as follows:
Eligible members of the Party Committee can join the board of directors,
the board of supervisors and the senior management through legal
procedures, while eligible members of the board of directors, the board of
supervisors and the senior management can also join the Party Committee
in accordance with relevant rules and procedures.129

Based on this provision, a person can only be appointed as a director if the
person is considered eligible by the CCP, and people likely must be loyal to
the Party to be considered eligible. In addition, the chairman of the board
and Party secretary of the Party committee can be the same person.130
Although such a measure would undoubtedly help enforce the CCP rules
inside a company, it is disputed whether such a person could uphold their
fiduciary duty of loyalty.131

128. The ICBC is one of the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) designated by the
Financial Stability Board, alongside the likes of Bank of America and Goldman Sachs, etc. See FIN.
STABILITY BD., 2019 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS), Annex (2019).
129. ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 52. See also Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 106
(“Eligible members of the Party committee are entitled to be admitted to the board of directors, the
supervisory committee, and the management through legal procedures, and eligible Party members from
the board of directors, the supervisory committee, and the management are entitled to be admitted to the
Party committee in accordance with relevant rules and procedures.”); China Railway Construction Corp.
(2018), supra note 119, art. 247 (“Eligible members in the Board, Supervisory Committee and
management may join the Party Committee in accordance with relevant requirements and procedures.”).
130. E.g., Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 106; China Railway Construction Corp. (2018),
supra note 119, art. 247; ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 52.
131. Zhang, supra note 21, at 60.
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Additionally, the Party committee may be responsible for developing
the CCP’s cadres132 and supervising the process of appointing management
personnel. Below is an example of how the Party committee is instructed to
act:
[t]o adhere to the principle of the Party exercising leadership over cadres,
the selection of management by the board of directors, and the exercise of
power as regards the right of cadres’ appointment by the management in
accordance with laws. The Party committee shall deliberate and give
opinions on the candidates nominated by the board of directors or the
general manager, or recommend nominees to the board of directors or the
general manager. The Party committee of the Company, together with the
board of directors, shall observe the proposed candidates and give
opinions collectively.133

This provision allows the CCP to control human resources decisions on the
appointment of personnel. By controlling the appointment and promotion of
personnel, the CCP can strengthen its control of a company directly by, for
example, having a person that the CCP favors to be in a company’s higher
position.
In summary, the Party building movement aims to strengthen the CCP’s
control over listed companies and entrench its role as a core element of
corporate governance. The political campaign is a product of the “legal and
ideological struggle in an uncertain course charted by CCP policies” since
the 1970s between the market economy and political authoritarianism.134 It
also underlines the conflict between China’s stated policy of following the
corporate governance principles and the desire to strengthen CCP’s role in a
listed company.135 Eventually, the “integration of the Party leadership with
corporate governance may further complicate the already overloaded legal
framework and its rational function,”136 increasing the “challenges and
difficulties to the accountability and enforcement of corporate
governance.”137
132. In general, a cadre “refers to a public official holding a responsible or managerial position,
usually full time, in party and government.” Marcia R. Ristaino, Party and Government, in CHINA: A
COUNTRY STUDY 407, 434 (Robert L. Worden et al. eds., 4th ed. 1988). The CCP’s cadre system serves
as an important regime function for the CCP to control human resources and managerial positions within
the Party and the Chinese government, on all levels.
133. Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 107(2); see also China Railway Construction Corp.
(2018), supra note 119, art. 248(ii) (“The Party Committee of the Company shall . . . adhere to the
principle of the Party exercising leadership over the cadres, the principle of the legitimate selection of
operators by the Board, and the exercise of power as regards the right of cadres’ appointment by the
operators in accordance with law.”).
134. Zhang, supra note 21, at 57.
135. Id. at 55–56, 59.
136. Id. at 60.
137. Id.

CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

330

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2021 10:16 PM

[Vol 31:301

In sum, Party building provisions open the doors to CCP interference to
varying degrees. Of the three kinds of provisions, one introduces the CCP
into a company through a Party organization (i.e., the organizational
interference). The second grants the Party organization the ex ante power to
review major company decisions (i.e., “management interference”). The
third allows the CCP to control the appointment of the company’s board of
directors or managers (i.e., human resources interference). Party building is
meant to have a substantial impact on Chinese businesses, whether they are
SOEs or not.
B. Adopting Party Building Provisions
1. Chinese Businesses Listed in Hong Kong
This Part examines how Chinese businesses on the Hong Kong
Exchange (HKEx) responded to the CCP mandate to incorporate Party
building provisions. HKEx classifies Chinese businesses into two categories:
H-share companies and red-chip companies.138 Hong Kong defines H-share
companies as those “incorporated in Mainland China and whose listings in
Hong Kong are approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC).”139 In contrast, “red chip companies are enterprises that are
incorporated outside of the Mainland and are controlled by Mainland
government entities.”140 Although registered outside China, a red-chip
company usually derives more than 55% of its revenue or assets from
China.141 This means that a red-chip company’s major business operations
and revenue come from the Mainland. As of 2018, 104 H-share companies
(those incorporated in mainland China) were cross-listed on the Shanghai or
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, making their shares available for trading in
domestic and foreign markets. In contrast, no red-chip company (those
incorporated outside mainland China) is cross-listed on a Chinese stock
exchange.

138. China Dimension, HKEX [hereinafter China Dimension], https://www.hkex.com.hk/MarketData/Statistics/Consolidated-Reports/China-Dimension?sc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/2C2T-68X7#sel
ect1=0&select2=0] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (use the second drop down menu under the words “CHINA
DIMENSION” to navigate between “List of H Share Companies” and “List of Red Chip Companies”
lists).
139. Overview of the Listed Market, HKEX [hereinafter Overview of the Listed Market],
https://www.hkex.com.hk/Global/Exchange/FAQ/Getting-Started/Overview-of-the-listed-market?sc_la
ng=en [https://perma.cc/2E2W-Z5UT] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (click on the words “In what ways are
H-share companies different from red chips? How can investors obtain the lists of the companies?”); see
also FTSE RUSSELL, GUIDE TO CHINESE SHARE CLASSES: V.1.5, at 3 (2019).
140. Overview of the Listed Market, supra note 139.
141. FTSE RUSSELL, supra note 139.
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In order to list on a foreign stock exchange, Chinese companies often
adopt the “variable interest entity” (VIE) corporate structure. Sina’s initial
public offering, which runs a popular web portal in China, popularized the
VIE structure among Chinese businesses who wanted to carry out their initial
public offerings and list on a foreign stock exchange.142 As a VIE, business
operations are still conducted by the domestic Chinese company (Company
X) in China, but the entity listed in a foreign stock exchange is a company
incorporated in a foreign country (Company Y). The foreign incorporated
entity (Company Y) does not directly own the domestic business (Company
X) and vice versa. Instead, Company Y’s control over Company X is
established through a complex web of contracts.143 Company X’s profits or
losses are eventually reflected in Company Y’s account. Despite the inherent
risks associated with the opaque structure,144 it helps evade Chinese laws that
restrain foreign capital in Chinese companies and circumvents controls over
foreign direct investment.145 This might explain the popularity of the VIE
structure among Chinese companies who use foreign-incorporated entities
for their initial public offerings. Over 92 percent of Chinese companies listed
on the NASDAQ use the VIE structure.146 The VIE structure also means that
Company Y is only listed in a foreign stock exchange and not cross-listed in
a Chinese stock exchange.
Chinese companies often list on the HKEx, given Hong Kong’s
proximity to China’s southern shore. Hong Kong’s status as an international
financial center helps Chinese companies “raise capital in a freely
convertible currency . . . for their business development”, enjoy greater
liquidity, and a better regulatory environment.147 Listing on HKEx also
boost investors’ confidence because of Hong Kong Securities and Futures
Commission corporate governance requirements that are on par with

142. Mengwei Ma, The Perils and Prospects of China’s Variable Interest Entities: Unraveling the
Murky Rules and the Institutional Challenges Posed, 43 H.K.L.J. 1061, 1061–62 (2013); Yu-Hsin Lin &
Thomas Mehaffy, Open Sesame: The Myth of Alibaba’s Extreme Corporate Governance and Control, 10
BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 437, 444–46 (2016).
143. Ma, supra note 142, at 1063.
144. Id. at 1067–71.
145. Samuel Farrell Ziegler, Note, China’s Variable Interest Entity Problem: How Americans Have
Illegally Invested Billions in China and How to Fix It, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 539, 541, 547–48 (2016);
Ma, supra note 142, at 1064–65.
146. Coco Liu, Chinese Offshore IPOs Grow More Reliant on Shaky Legal Structure, NIKKEI ASIA
(Oct. 8, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Chinese-offshore-IPOs-grow-morereliant-on-shaky-legal-structure/ [https://perma.cc/9EWU-GP5M].
147. HKEX, FACT SHEET ON THE LISTING OF H-SHARES 3 (2013), https://www.hkex.com.hk//media/hkex-market/news/news-release/2013/130806news/fact-sheet_20th-h-shares [https://perma.cc/4
CNW-MUU7].
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international standards.148 Among twelve markets, the Asian Corporate
Governance Association ranked Hong Kong second, and China tenth on
corporate governance.149 To deal with the listing of Chinese businesses, the
HKEx has a dedicated chapter in its listing rules that govern companies
incorporated in China.150
By the end of 2018, 423 Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong151 on
both the main board and the growth enterprise market (GEM) board.152
Regardless of whether they are H-share or red-chips, most Chinese
businesses listed in Hong Kong are SOE. Based on the Wind database153,
299 (70.69%) of the 423 companies were SOEs. The central government
controlled 172 of the SOEs (“central SOEs”) whereas provincial or local
governments controlled 127 (“local SOEs”). Less than 30 percent (29.31%)
of companies were private enterprises.154
Of the 423, 260 were H-share and 163 were red-chips155 (presented in
Table 1 below.)

148. Id. at 3–4.
149. ASIAN CORP. GOVERNANCE ASS’N & CLSA LTD., CG WATCH 2018: HARD DECISIONS: ASIA
FACES TOUGH CHOICES IN CG REFORM 16 (2018), https://www.acga-asia.org/files.php?aid=362
&id=1196 [https://perma.cc/8NKS-2DS6].
150. See HKEX, LISTING RULES, ch. 19A, https://en-rules.hkex.com.hk/sites/default/files/net_file
_store/HKEX4476_3208_VER40.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GPM-DDPB] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
151. The data is calculated based on the date of listing provided by the HKEx. China Dimension,
supra note 138. The figure does not include one company, Sinotrans Shipping Ltd. (stock code: 368),
which was delisted in October 2018. Id.
152. The Mainboard is the major market place for established listed companies in Hong Kong. In
contrast, the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) board is a “market with lower listing eligibility criteria . . .
compared to the Main Board, serving the needs of small and mid-sized issuers.” See Listing Process for
Listing on GEM, HKEX, https://www.hkex.com.hk/Join-Our-Market/IPO/Getting-Started/Listing-onGEM?sc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/H7J7-Z4AF] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
153. Wind database is a financial information services provider in China, specializing in financial
information of Chinese companies and the Chinese market. About Us, WIND,
https://www.wind.com.cn/en/about.html [https://perma.cc/N8UV-C3LS] (last visited September 19,
2020).
154. It should be noted that a private enterprise might still have state owners, except the state would
not be a controlling shareholder.
155. The list of companies is extracted from the website of Hong Kong Exchange. China Dimension,
supra note 138. Based on the list of companies, the study calculates the number of H-share and red-chip
companies on both the Main Board and GEM.

CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2(DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

5/27/2021 10:16 PM

INTERFERENCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES

333

Table 1. Number of Chinese Businesses Listed in Hong Kong by Listing Boards
and Types
H-share

Red-chip

Total

Main Board

236

158

394

Growth Enterprise market

24

5

29

Total

260

163

423

Among the 260 H-share companies, 59.26% (154 of 260) were
identified as SOEs, and nearly 90% (142 of 159) of the red-chip companies
were SOEs based on the designation by the Wind database. Thus, Chinese
SOEs have not only chosen to list in Hong Kong via the H-share channel but
also used foreign-incorporated entities as their listing entity in Hong Kong.
In summary, 423 Chinese businesses are listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange (HKEx). Most (70.69%) of the companies are SOEs. Some are
incorporated in China, classified as H-share companies, and others are
incorporated outside China, classified as red-chip companies. The next
section explores the extent to which those 423 companies adopted Party
building provisions.
2. Incorporating Party Building Provisions
This section evaluates compliance with the CCP’s mandate, as
measured by the rate of Party-building provisions incorporated into
corporate constitutions. Given that Chinese law requires government
approval to list a domestic entity in Hong Kong,156 SOEs are more likely to
be allowed to list overseas than non-SOEs.157 This Article expected that
SOEs (whether listed as H-share or red-chips) would adopt Party building
given the state ownership and the CCP’s control over the government under
China’s one-party political system. Despite the omnipresence of the CCP in
China, private enterprises are less likely to comply because they are not
directly controlled by the state or the CCP.

156. See Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Guifan Jingnei Shangshi Gongsi
Suoshu Qiye Dao Jingwai Shangshi Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (中国证券监督管理委员会关于规范
境内上市公司所属企业到境外上市有关问题的通知) [Circular of the China Securities Regulatory
Commission on Several Issues Concerning the Standardization on Overseas Listing of Subordinated
Enterprises of Domestically-Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, July 21,
2004, effective July 21, 2004), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=10081&CGid=#
[https://perma.cc/UN3Q-ZDM6].
157. Mingyi Hung et al., Political Considerations in the Decision of Chinese SOEs to List in Hong
Kong, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 435, 435 (2012).
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Surprisingly, the data revealed a different picture. The study tracked
corporate constitutions158 to measure compliance with the CCP mandate.
The study also examined the kind of compliance adopted by looking at three
kinds of provisions—organizational, management, and human resources
interference—into their constitutions.159 Compliance was measured by the
rate of adoption of any party-building provision among all companies.
Despite encouragement from the CCP since 2016, only 33.1% of companies
(140 of 423) adopted any kind of Party building provision by the end of 2018.
Furthermore, 53.46% (139 of the 260) H-share companies (those
incorporated in Mainland China) complied with the mandate, whereas only
a single (0.61%) red-chip company (incorporated outside China) complied.
In short, companies incorporated in China were more likely to adopt Party
building provisions than foreign-incorporated Chinese businesses.160
This study also examined the compliance rate between SOEs and
private enterprises. As most Chinese businesses in Hong Kong were Chinese
SOEs, regardless of where the listed entity was incorporated, it was no
surprise that SOEs were more likely to adopt Party building provisions than
private enterprises. Of the 299 SOEs, 121 (40.47%) adopted Party building
provisions. In contrast, only 19 of 124 private enterprises (15.32%) adopted
such provisions.161 However, SOEs incorporated in China were much more
likely to incorporate Party building into their constitutions than SOEs
incorporated offshore (i.e., the red-chips). If SOEs are supposed to be more
likely to follow the CCP’s mandate, the interesting question is why SOEs
incorporated outside the mainland were much less likely to do so. Part IV
further explores the result by examining the kinds of provisions that were
adopted.
3. The Types of Party Building Provisions Adopted
Equipped with the overall compliance rate among different Chinese
businesses, this Section shifts to analyzing the kinds of provisions adopted.
Although SASAC issued template provisions, the provisions that were
adopted varied, as demonstrated in Table 2. The Table demonstrates the

158. HKEX NEWS, http://www3.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/advancedsearch/search_active
_main.aspx [https://perma.cc/3LED-FF4Y] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021). This website is the disclosure
platform by the Hong Kong Exchange. To determine whether a company adopted party building
provisions we searched for the company by its stock code and located different versions of a company’s
constitutional documents since 2015 to examine whether there has been any change made for Party
Building using some keywords (e.g. “Communist”).
159. See supra Part III.A.
160. The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 22.3, p < 0.001; Fisher’s exact < 0.001).
161. The difference between SOEs and private enterprises is statistically significant (chi2 = 25.03,
p < 0.001).
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adoption rate of party-building provisions: organizational interference,
management interference, and human resources interference. The following
paragraphs pertains only to companies that incorporated any kind of
provision. When measured against the total number of companies, the
overall adoption rate for each kind of provision is less than one-third.
Table 2. The Adoption of Different Provisions
Provisions

Number of
companies

% of companies
adopting Party
building
(n = 140)

% of total Chinese
businesses listed in Hong
Kong, including nonadopting companies
(n = 423)

Having Party organization

137

97.86%

32.39%

Integrating CCP constitution

139

99.29%

32.86%

Supporting Party organization’s
resources

119

85.00%

28.13%

With disciplinary committee

94

67.14%

22.22%

Full-time deputy Party secretary

65

46.43%

15.37%

120

85.71%

28.37%

Chairman and Party secretary are
the same person

54

38.57%

12.77%

Supervising CCP’s cadre

109

77.86%

25.77%

Organizational interference

Management interference
Consulting Party organization
before major decisions
Human resources interference

Of the companies that complied with the mandate, companies most
commonly accepted provisions related to organizational interference,
regardless of whether they were SOEs or private enterprises. More
specifically, nearly all companies adopted the presence of the Party
organization within the company (97.86%) and integrated the CCP’s
constitution (99.29%).162 However, other organizational interference
provisions were not uniformly adopted. Although over a majority of
companies agreed to provide the Party organization with resources (85%),
only two-thirds agreed to form a disciplinary committee (67.14%).
Employing a full-time deputy Party secretary was even less popular
(46.43%). Thus, it appears that most of the companies incorporated the
presence of a Party organization, which might have already been in place, or
162. See supra Part III.A.
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integrating the CCP’s constitution. However, they did not favor the
monitoring that would result from a disciplinary committee or full-time
deputy secretary.
In addition to adopting organizational interference, most companies
also complied with management interference. Over 85% of companies
agreed to consult with the Party before making major decisions. The
adoption rate is similar with supporting party organization’s resources. Thus,
most adopting companies seemed to be acceptable to organizational and
management interference.
Despite compliance with the other two provisions, companies were less
likely to accept human resources interference. Although over three-quarters
of companies adopted the CCP’s supervision over cadres, fewer than 40% of
the companies incorporated that the chairman of the board of directors and
the Party secretary would be the same person. In addition, only about 2/3 of
adopting firms accept the disciplinary committee. Obviously firms adopting
Party building are less keen on those two provisions.
Table 3. The Adoption of Different Provisions by SOEs and Private Enterprises
Provisions

SOEs
Number of
companies
adopting

% of
total
SOE (n
= 299)

% of
SOEs
adopting
(n = 121)

Number of
companies
adopting

% of total
private
enterprises
(n = 124)

% of private
enterprises
adopting (n
= 19)

39.8%

98.35%

18

14.52%

94.74%

40.13%

99.17%

19

15.32%

100%

34.11%

84.3%

17

13.71%

89.47%

27.09%

66.94%

13

10.48%

68.42%

18.73%

46.28%

9

7.26%

47.37%

34.78%

85.95%

16

12.3%

84.21%

44

14.72%

36.36%

10

8.06%

52.63%

96

32.11%

79.34%

13

10.48%

68.42%

Organizational interference
Having Party
119
organization
Integrating CCP
120
constitution
Supporting Party
102
organization’s
resources
With
disciplinary
committee

Private enterprises

81

Full-time deputy
56
Party secretary
Management interference
Consulting Party
104
organization
before major
decisions
Human resources interference
Chairman and
Party secretary
are the same
person
Supervising
CCP’s cadre
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Table 3 examines the kinds of “Party building” provisions adopted by
SOEs and private enterprises. Two interesting questions arise from Table 3.
Why did some SOEs fail to formalize Party building in their companies two
years after President Xi Jinping’s policy statement in October 2016?163
Second, why did private enterprises comply despite lacking any substantial
state ownership?
Politically connected private enterprises listed in Mainland China are
more likely to adopt party-building provisions than other non-connected
companies.164 However, adoption tends to be symbolic.165 Our data supports
that finding. Among the companies incorporating Party building, there was
little difference between SOEs and private enterprises when it came to
having a Party organization, integrating the CCP’s constitution, and
supporting the Party organization. Adopting organizational interference
provisions demonstrates minimum degrees of loyalty to the Party by
accepting the CCP’s presence in the company.
The difference between SOEs and private enterprises pertained to
provisions regarding human resources interference. Among the private
enterprises, there were more instances in which a single individual was both
the chairman and the Party secretary, although there was less acceptance of
CCP supervision over the Party cadre. However, there was no clear proof
indicating that SOEs were more likely to accept the dual role of chairman
and Party secretary166 or the provision allowing CCP supervision of
personnel and CCP cadres.167
In addition, among SOEs, those controlled by the central government
(central SOEs) were more likely than other SOEs (local SOEs) to accept
management and human resources interference. Central SOEs were more
likely to adopt the provision for management interference, with 58 out of 63
(92.06%) incorporating it as opposed to 46 out of 58 (79.31%) local SOEs.168
Central SOEs were more likely to adopt the dual position of chairman and
Party secretary169 and allow the Party organization to supervise their
personnel and the CCP cadre.170
To some extent, the data presented in this Article is compatible with
other studies focusing on SOEs listed on Chinese stock exchanges. A study
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23.
Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 19–22.
Id.
The difference is not statistically significant (chi2 = 1.834, p = 0.176).
The difference is not statistically significant (chi2 = 1.135, p = 0.287).
The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 4.067, p = 0.044).
The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 5.309, p = 0.021).
The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 5.083, p = 0.024).
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found that SOEs were more likely to adopt Party-building provisions than
those on foreign exchanges. The study also found that 676 out of 808
(83.67%) SOEs listed in China adopted “management interference”
provisions.171 Seven hundred thirty-two companies (90.59%) had agreed to
the dual-role of chairman and Party secretary, and 713 companies (88.24%)
had allowed the CCP to become involved in personnel decisions.172 In
addition, a more recent study showed that 57.88% of the adopting SOEs
listed in China accepted management interference, 34.30% accepted the
dual-role of chairman and Party secretary, and 65.93% agreed to the Party’s
control over the cadre.173 Based on 299 SOEs listed in Hong Kong
(regardless of whether they were cross-listed in China), our data showed that
34.78% of these SOEs adopted management interference, 14.72% accepted
the dual-role and 32.11% agreed to the Party’s control over the cadre.
Comparing with other studies focusing on listed SOEs in China, this Article
shows that Chinese SOEs were less inclined to adopt Party building
provisions if they were listed outside of China. This aligns with prior
observations that foreign-incorporated companies, or red chips, were less
likely to adopt Party building.
A further question was whether the amount of state ownership stakes
affects the decision to adopt Party building provisions. Previous research
suggested that an SOE is more likely to adopt Party building if the state owns
a higher proportion of the company.174 This study relied on the largest
shareholder’s direct shareholding as a benchmark to measure state ownership
because existing databases do not present full beneficial ownership data.175
Using logistic regression, the study examined whether the number of shares
held by the largest shareholder impacted Party building provisions’ adoption.
At first, the regression did not yield any significant result because the
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder did not correlate with
the decision as to whether to adopt Party building (p = 0.187). However,
adding a dummy variable to the equation regarding the company’s H-share
status showed that both the percentage of shares held by the largest
shareholder (p < 0.001) and the company’s status as an H-share company (p
< 0.001) had a positive effect on the likelihood of adopting “Party building.”

171. Liu & Zhang, supra note 37, at 8 tbl.3.
172. Id.
173. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 19–20 tbl.4.
174. Liu & Zhang, supra note 37; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 20–21 tbl.5.
175. For example, the CSMAR database provides the names of the largest shareholders or the
beneficial interest holders. However, it is not clear from the database or the names whether the holders
are related to the state.
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The H-share dummy had a much more pronounced effect (odds ratio =
230.44) than the largest shareholder (coefficient = 1.03).
There were similar effects when adopting the same model to analyze
the odds of adopting provisions related to organizational interference or
human resources interference. Nevertheless, no statistically significant result
emerged when the study analyzed the management interference provision.
This indicated that the largest shareholder’s degree of direct control would
matter if a company was incorporated in China (i.e., an H-share company).
It was also consistent with previous studies of Party building reforms for
SOEs listed in China.176 However, this was less of a problem for red-chip
companies. The result might reflect the general disinclination of red-chip
companies to adopt any Party building provisions.
Furthermore, highly regulated industries were more likely to adopt
Party building provisions than less regulated industries.177 Utilizing WIND’s
industry classification,178 this study identified five highly-regulated
industries: finance, public utilities, mining, energy, and real estate, based on
earlier research on political influence and the post-IPO performance of
Chinese companies.179 Out of the 423 companies studied, 192 (45.39%) were
in one of the highly regulated industries. These included 78 financial
institutions, 29 public utility companies, 32 real estate companies, 17 energy
companies, and 36 mining companies. Of those 192 highly-regulated
companies, 76 companies (39.58%) included Party building in their
constitutions, whereas only 27.71% of less-regulated companies complied.
Thus, there was a correlation between the degree of regulation and
acceptance of Party building provisions.
Companies in highly regulated industries, like finance, are expected to
be more likely to adopt Party building because increased interactions with
regulators invite political interference.180 For example, public utilities such
as water, electricity, and petroleum often attract strong public interest and,
consequently, government intervention, exposing them to political influence.
Thus, those companies are expected to experience more political pressure to
176. Liu & Zhang, supra note 37; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 22–23.
177. The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 6.680, p = 0.010).
178. See WIND, WIND HANGYE FENLEI BIAOZHUN (WIND行业分类标准) [THE INDUSTRY
CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS OF WIND DATABASE] (2005), http://net.wind.com.cn/WindNET/Bulletin/
express/WICS_Full_200501.pdf [https://perma.cc/REZ6-X6HQ].
179. Joseph P.H. Fan et al., Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO
Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330, 340 (2007).
180. See Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 1015 (noting that it is easier for politicians to use
their control over regulated firms to pursue political objectives when there is heavy regulation of firms,
due to lowered costs); supra Part II.A.1 (discussing different types of political interference in corporate
governance).
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adopt Party building. Given the extensive regulations, it is reasonable to
assume that such entities could be more susceptible to political pressure
exercised by regulatory bodies.
In particular, financial firms were more likely to adopt Party building
provisions than companies in any other industry.181 It could be because firms
in financial services are subject to intensive regulations by financial
regulators, whether they are banks, insurance companies, or securities
brokers. However, the data cannot explain whether companies in other
highly regulated industries (e.g., mining or public utilities) are more or less
likely to adopt Party building. Therefore, one should be careful not to
overstate the role of industry in adopting Party building.
C. Hong Kong’s Reaction to Party Building
This study next considers the market’s reaction to the Party building
reform. Utilizing the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), 182 the study
observed two events: (1) President Xi Jinping’s public announcement on
October 12, 2016;183 and (2) the official publication of the “Party building”
template provisions on January 3, 2017.184 The former event was when
President Xi made an important policy declaration, and the latter was when
it became clear what Party building might mean in practice. We expect the
market to respond to these two significant events which signal the CCP’s
political interference with listed companies’ governance. If the market
reacted negatively as measured by the CAR, it would indicate that the market
disfavored the Party building reform, and the event could hurt shareholder
value. The opposite would be true if the CAR were positive.
The study used shares trading data of the 423 companies listed in Hong
Kong on the days surrounding the two events. The event windows were 11
days, 5 days, and 3 days before and after the event day (i.e. [-5, 5], [-2, 2], [1, 1]) and a window of 1 day after the event day ([0, 1]). The analysis
measured these companies’ stock returns against the stock returns of the

181. The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 12.340, p < 0.001).
182. In general, a cumulative abnormal return is the sum of each daily abnormal return within an
event window. An abnormal return is the actual stock market return minus the expected return based on
a market model. See Abnormal Return, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/
knowledge/trading-investing/abnormal-return/ [https://perma.cc/K4RH-WMH4] (last visited Mar. 25,
2021).
183. See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23.
184. See, e.g., Requirements of Incorporation of Party Building Work, supra note 114.
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Hang Seng Index, the leading stock market index in Hong Kong,185 for the
previous 20 to 170 days before the event day.186 Table 4 shows the results:
Table 4. Summary of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%)
Variable

Mean

t Value

Pr > |t|

Variable

Mean

t Value

Pr > |t|

-0.752

-4.09***

<.0001

Event date: October 12, 2016

Event Date: January 3, 2017

N = 373

N = 377

[0, 1]

0.1861

1.13

0.2593

[0, 1]

[-1, 1]

0.5625

2.69***

0.0074

[-1, 1]

-0.11

-0.62

0.536

[-2, 2]

0.8763

3.34***

0.0009

[-2, 2]

-0.391

-1.71*

0.089

[-5, 5]

2.0708

5.46***

<.0001

[-5, 5]

-1.519

-4.4***

<.0001

“*”, “**” and “***” represent “p < 0.1,” “p < 0.05,” and “p < 0.01,” respectively

The data presented in Table 4 show a contrasting pattern. On October
12, 2016, when President Xi Jinping made the policy declaration, investors
in Hong Kong reacted positively during the 3-day, 5-day, and 10-day event
windows. However, when model provisions were published on January 3,
2017, the market responded negatively. On both occasions, the CAR value
for the data was statistically significant.
The consistently positive response to the October 2016 announcement
could be a result of optimistic market sentiment after a long holiday break in
China. According to the literature, it is unclear whether long holidays could
cause the stock market to rise or fall before or after the break.187 President
Xi made the announcement during a Party conference, immediately after
China’s long National Day holiday starting on October 1.188 However, this

185. The current and historical constituents of the Hang Seng Index are available on the website of
Hang Seng Indexes Company Ltd. See Hang Seng Index and Sub-Indexes, HANG SENG INDEXES,
https://www.hsi.com.hk/eng/indexes/all-indexes/hsi [https://perma.cc/7X6D-R5VE] (last visited Sept.
21, 2020).
186. The data source utilized for this analysis was Datastream, an online database on the global stock
markets located on the Refinitiv website. See Datastream, REFINITIV, https://www.refinitiv.com/en/
products/datastream-macroeconomic-analysis [https://perma.cc/76W5-KQU8] (last visited September
21, 2020).
187. See, e.g., Tian Yuan et al., The Pre-Holiday Effect in China: Abnormal Returns or
Compensation for Risk?, 18 REV. PAC. BASIN FIN. MKT. & POLICIES 1550014-1 (2015); Tian Yuan &
Rakesh Gupta, Chinese Lunar New Year Effect in Asian Stock Markets, 1999-2012, 54 Q. REV. ECON. &
FIN. 529 (2014). In contrast, an Australian study found a potential pre-holiday effect on the stock market,
but no post-holiday effect. See George J. Marrett & Andrew C. Worthington, An Empirical Note on the
Holiday Effect in the Australian Stock Market, 1996-2006, 16 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 1769 (2009).
188. In 2016, the National Day holiday started from October 1 and ran until October 7, 2016,
followed by the weekend on October 8 and 9, 2016. Alexandra Suarez, China’s Golden Week 2016:
Country Spends $180 Billion During National Holiday, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016, 1:49 PM),

CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

342

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2021 10:16 PM

[Vol 31:301

Article does not measure the possible effect of the stock market movement
following the long holiday, though the possibility that CARs were affected
by holidays cannot be excluded.
Furthermore, the market may have responded positively in 2016
because the market did not fully appreciate the vague wordings in President
Xi’s speech, such as incorporating the Party’s leadership into all corners of
corporate governance or embedding Party organization into corporate
governance structure.189 In contrast, by January 2017, investors knew more
precisely how the CCP would implement Party building in the corporate
governance of listed companies based on the template provisions. Thus, once
the substance of Party building was better understood, the market reacted
negatively, indicating that the market saw the CCP’s political interference
through Party building to be hurting the companies (and henceforth the
negative CAR in January 2017).
Observing the January 2017 event, the CARs of red-chip companies
was lower than that of H-share companies. The difference in the means was
statistically significant when a two-sample t-test was used.190 This indicated
that investors responded more negatively to the news when it affected redchip companies, Chinese businesses incorporated outside China. For the
three-day event window, the mean of CAR for H-share companies was
0.12%, as opposed to 0.55% for red-chips. For the five-day event window,
the mean of CAR for H-share companies was 0.02%, in contrast to 0.98%
for red-chips. Although most red-chips are Chinese SOEs, this suggests that
the Party building movement enhanced the risk that foreign-incorporated
businesses would be subject to a higher degree of political interference than
outside investors were willing to accept. If so, the data reflects the negative
effects of external political interference.191 Other variables, such as whether
a firm was an SOE or cross-listed in China’s A-share market, lacked
statistical significance.
D. Summary of Findings
This Part presents several findings regarding how Chinese businesses
listed in Hong Kong responded to the Party building movement. First, only
about a third of these companies accepted Party building within two years of

https://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-golden-week-2016-country-spends-180-billion-during-nationalholiday-2429709 [https://perma.cc/Z5DX-6CNF].
189. See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23.
190. For example, p = 0.037 for a 3-day event window and p = 0.031 for a 5-day event window.
191. See supra Part II.A.
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President Xi’s policy declaration.192 Second, companies incorporated in
China, or H-share companies, incorporated were more likely to adopt “Party
building” than companies incorporated outside China or red-chip companies.
This suggests that foreign-incorporated companies were more resistant to the
influence of the CCP. Third, among the companies that incorporated “Party
building” provisions, most accepted organizational interference, such as
having a Party organization. Additionally, over 75% accepted management
interference through Party supervision of cadres. However, companies were
less likely to incorporate a full-time deputy Party secretary or a disciplinary
committee. Companies were also reluctant to have the same person serve as
both the chairman and Party secretary. Fourth, for companies incorporated
in China, the more shares held by the majority shareholder, the more likely
the company adopted Party building. However, this effect was not as
pronounced for companies incorporated outside China. From these
observations, Part IV reflects on how regulators respond to foreign political
interference.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON DETERRING POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
BY FOREIGN ACTORS
A. Explaining the Reactions by Corporate Stakeholders
Any regulatory action to counter foreign political interference should
be based on reactions by corporate stakeholders. Part II of predicted that
stakeholders generally object to external political interference.193 Managers
do not welcome interference that undermines their discretion. Similarly, nonstate investors disfavor political interference because the state’s agenda may
divert resources away from value-maximizing allocations. Therefore,
companies are generally expected to resist foreign political interference.
The evidence presented in Part III supported this hypothesis.
Approximately one-third of companies adopted some forms of Party
building provisions. Perhaps more will succumb to continuing political
pressure unless there is a radical change in the CCP’s policy. However, many
companies did not swiftly comply with the CCP’s mandate, even among
SOEs. The lukewarm responses of the SOEs were surprising. SOEs were
expected to quickly adopt Party building, given their state ownership and the
pre-existing relationship between the management and the CCP.
This Article argues that companies did not adopt “Party building”
provisions because of management’s rejection or delay, despite the external
192. As mentioned previously, President Xi Jinping made the policy declaration on October 12,
2016. See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23.
193. See supra Part II.B.
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governmental mandate.194 On the one hand, it is probably not due to a strong
and negative market reaction to Party building to prevent SOEs from
adopting Party building. As Part III revealed, the Hong Kong market did not
have a particularly strong negative reaction (reflected in the CARs) to the
policy declaration in October 2016. Furthermore, the market exhibited a
marginally negative reaction to the publication of template Party building
provisions a few months later. Thus, although the market responded
negatively to the sample provisions’ publication, it did not elicit a forcible
reaction. The stock market, thus, likely did not act as a restraint to
compliance with the CCP.
On the other hand, reluctance to adopt Party building was also probably
not due to a potential takeover by another company. Especially for Chinese
SOEs, the market for corporate control was, arguably, non-existent due to
tight state-ownership. Our data cannot fully measure the true level of state
ownership in Chinses SOEs, as the true extent of state ownership is not fully
disclosed to the public. According to the OECD, the Chinese state owned
more than 70% of SOEs’ voting power on average.195 Given these high state
ownership stakes, the chance that a non-state player could acquire control
over a Chinese SOE outside of China was extremely low. Hence, it is highly
unlikely that concern over potential takeovers restrained the decision to
adopt Party building.
Thus, the decision to not comply with Party building, notably for SOEs
incorporated outside of China, likely came from management. In another
study focusing on companies listed in China, some companies only
underwent amendments of their constitutions at the behest of SASAC,
demonstrating resistance by SOE managers.196 In fact, there have been at
least two reported cases where shareholders have rejected Party building.197
Undoubtedly, non-state shareholders played a role in the final decision if we
assume that state owners should vote in favor of Party building. In one case,
39% of the holders of H-shares in the ICBC voted against Party building.198
In another case, the Tianjin Real Estate Group shareholders voted down the
Party building amendment in 2017, despite state control over 26% of its

194. Studies on Mainland-listed companies show that managerial resistance mainly comes from
central SOEs that underperformed and are less competitive internationally. See Lin, supra note 80, at 29–
32.
195. OECD, Chapter 4: The Theory of the Market for Corporate Control and the Current State of
the Market for Corporate Control in China, at 34, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance
ofstate-ownedenterprises/31601011.pdf [https://perma.cc/59EL-3E3L] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020).
196. See Lin, supra note 80, at 26–29.
197. See Zhang, supra note 21, at 59.
198. Id.
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shares.199 It has also been reported that 20.52% of minority shareholders and
52.34% of the H-share companies’ foreign shareholders voted against Party
building amendment proposals.200 Therefore, it is less likely due to
shareholders’ revolt that companies resist Party building.
One explanation of managers’ resistance is that companies listed
outside China are more exposed to the stakeholders outside China, which the
CCP cannot control. These companies may face more pressure from
non-Chinese shareholders, especially institutional shareholders. Any
significant impact on share prices may also increase the cost of financing. If
so, the managers of such companies would naturally prefer to delay Party
building.
The complex VIE structure201 may also assist the management’s
resistance to Party building. The VIE structure could empower managers to
resist political interference to some extent. Formal restraint in a VIE
structured company is relatively weaker, employed through a series of
contracts and corporate chains, instead of through direct shareholders’ rights,
typical of companies incorporated in China, through which the CCP can
directly control state owners. Thus, the VIE structure implies that the parent
company in China has less control over a listed entity incorporated offshore.
It explains the low adoption rate by red-chip companies, which are
incorporated outside China.
In addition, data presented in this Article is also consistent with the
bonding theory, which suggests that cross-listing in multiple stock markets
creates a “bonding mechanism.”202 In such cases, companies must comply
with “higher regulatory or disclosure standards and thus to implement a form
of ‘bonding’ under which firms commit to governance standards more
exacting than those of their home countries.”203 The bonding theory could
partially explain why the H-share companies were more likely to adopt
“Party building” than the red-chip companies. Many H-share companies are
cross-listed in either Shanghai or Shenzhen. For cross-listed companies, the
actual number of shares available for trading in Hong Kong (i.e., H-shares)
represents a relatively small percentage of the total number of shares.204
199. Id.
200. Lin, supra note 80, at 21.
201. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the VIE structure).
202. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 674 (1999).
203. Id. at 652.
204. According to one report, the average total market capitalization of the A-share market of those
dual-listed companies in both China and Hong Kong was two or three times larger than that of the Hshare market, despite H-shares having a higher level of free float than A-shares. FTSE RUSSELL,
CAPTURING THE CHINESE A-SHARES AND H-SHARES ANOMALY 4 (2017).
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Investors in China may be less sensitive to external political interference than
investors in Hong Kong. Being incorporated in China also means that Hshare companies face more direct political pressure than red-chip companies,
as they still have their head offices in the Mainland.
That being said, companies are nonetheless amenable to some forms of
organizational interference and management interference by the CCP. After
all, many companies probably already had Party organization inside the
company before the Party building campaign.205 For those companies,
formalizing a Party organization’s presence and its role in the company may
not be more than recognizing the company’s existing state. In addition,
although consulting Party committees for major decisions reduces
managerial discretion, it might not be wise to show hostility to Party
members because it could be, for one, detrimental to a manager’s career. For
example, a manager defying the CCP’s instruction may not receive
promotions in the company or other places, especially when the manager has
some political ambition. Being cordial to the Party committee and
formalizing some of its de facto functions could be an acceptable
compromise. This amenability might explain why the rate of agreeing to
consult the Party before a management decision has been similar to adopting
Party organizations.
In contrast, the companies demonstrated hostility, measured by low
adoption rate, to human resources interference and extra Party monitoring
such as a disciplinary inspection committee or full-time Party secretary. For
one, management should prefer to retain control over the company’s human
resources decisions, which are necessary for effective management. The
extra oversight exercised by the Party secretary or disciplinary inspection
committee may mean that a manager has to make a decision in accordance
with the interests of the CCP rather than the interests of the company if the
CCP’s interests are not aligned with the company’s.206 This explains why
these companies were less in favor of provisions that, for example, allowed
the CCP to manage Party cadre and the promotion of some managers. Hence,
the companies were less likely to incorporate intrusive “Party building”
provisions. In other words, management preferred to conduct operations
without outsiders dictating how things should be done. In turn, this indicates
that company managers were deliberately selective when complying with
Party building provisions. Perhaps there is a kind of trade-off. Instead of
facing sustained political pressure to adopt Party building provisions, it
205. See Zhang, supra note 21, at 60 (noting that by the end of 2016, 67.8% of domest private
enterprises and 70% of foreign investment enterprises had established party organizations).
206. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining how the extra oversight and threat of diciplinary
actions can cause a manager to prioritize the interests of the CCP, instead of the company’s interests).
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might be better to comply with less intrusive measures without relenting to
more direct control.
B. Regulatory Concerns and Responses
One might surmise that the low adoption rate means that regulators need
not be concerned. This Article cannot predict how the domestic political
climate in China and geopolitical events in the region, like the U.S.-China
trade war, will develop. If political pressure is sustained, there is a fair chance
that most SOEs, or even private enterprises, will succumb to Party building.
If we look beyond this case study, foreign political interference remains an
issue as long as foreign governments want to influence a listed company.
Investors in the stock market can still suffer losses if a foreign government
decides to sacrifice the company’s long-term interests and its shareholders
in favor of the government’s interest. The Party building movement offers a
rare chance to observe how company managers and shareholders respond to
external political interference from another country. Hence, the outcome of
this Article will provide valuable lessons for the future.
Based on the foregoing, this Article suggests that improving
transparency is a more efficient approach to empower corporate stakeholders
to deal with foreign political interference in corporate governance. As
demonstrated, management is generally not enthusiastic about adopting
Party building. Thus, managers provide the first layer of a company’s
defense. They might choose to ignore the political interference before
presenting it to shareholders. In addition, existing and prospective
shareholders can apply pressure to the management by selling shares of the
company in the market (thereby lowering share prices) if they consider
political interference harmful to the company. Together, the responses by
managers, shareholders, and investors could generate market power to curb
the acceptance of external political interference. The low adoption rate of
Party building by Chinese businesses in Hong Kong supports this argument.
It is important to improve transparency and to provide information regarding
external political interference to the stock market to ensure that corporate
stakeholders can make sound decisions. The approach thereby allows
managers and shareholders to decide what is best for their companies. The
Article refers to this as the market-driven approach.
However, the ability of a market-driven approach depends on market
conditions. The market requires shareholders to generate sufficient pressure
on management to resist Party building or external political interference.
Hong Kong’s stock market is international, with a variety of individual,
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institutional, and international investors.207 Hence, the market can provide
the power to restrain management’s conduct concerning foreign political
interference. Shareholders’ reactions might differ in the Chinese stock
markets. This Article did not cover Chinese businesses listed in other
markets (e.g., New York, London, or Singapore) and cautions against
drawing too many conclusions from the data.
In addition, our data also suggests an alternative approach, that
securities regulators could require companies to list with a foreignincorporated entity outside their home market to combat external political
interference. As indicated above, red-chip companies are far less likely to
adopt Party building than their H-share counterparts, even though many redchip companies are also SOEs.208 Thus, a foreign-incorporated entity may be
more immune to political interference from the CCP. If this is the case, one
normative suggestion is that regulators could request a company coming
from a market known to have strong political interference in corporate
governance to have the listing entity incorporated outside its home market
(e.g., a red-chip company). In short, a regulator could use foreign
incorporated companies to insulate the market from political pressure.
Nevertheless, there are some problems with this approach. It is unclear
whether there is a causal effect between the place of registration and the
decision to adopt Party building. It is also unclear how and to what extent
the VIE structure might remove a parent company from China’s control and
how the structure might result in more insulation from political interference.
However, forcing a listed entity to register outside its home market, if
possible, could be a politically unpopular move—especially when the home
market is a powerhouse like China. This listing requirement also does not
resolve the underlying challenges of governing, monitoring, and enforcing
rules against a foreign-incorporated entity when most of its assets and major
businesses are in another market. Thus, any potential gain from being
insulated from political interference could be outweighed by additional
monitoring costs. This, however, is a subject for another study.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a market-driven approach, rooted in transparency,
to resist foreign political interference in listed companies’ governance.
Although external political interference generally harms companies,
207. Per the Hong Kong Exchange’s survey published in 2017, institutional investors remain the
largest participant group in the market, and overseas investors are the largest investor group by origin (as
opposed to local investors). See News Release, HKEx, Survey Finds Hong Kong Securities Market
Attracts Wide Range of Investors (July 13, 2017) (on file with HKEx).
208. See supra Part III.B.3.
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stakeholders react differently depending on their interests. Securities
regulators’ response should, in turn, depend on the reactions of management,
minority shareholders, and prospective investors. This Article utilized the
Party building movement in China to examine how companies react to
political interference. Based on the template provisions that the Chinese
government expected companies to adopt into corporate constitutions, this
Article categorizes Party building provisions into three major forms:
organizational interference (relating to the formalization of CCP
organization in a company), management interference (relating the CCP’s
role in management’s decisions), and human resources interference (relating
to personnel promotion and the dual role of chairman and Party secretary).
This Article focused on Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong, an
international financial center and popular listing venue of Chinese firms.
Overall, less than a third of those companies adopted Party building
provisions by the end of 2018.209 Low adoption rates suggest that managers
resisted political interference, especially when a company was incorporated
outside Mainland China. The result shows that corporate stakeholders,
including managers, shareholders, and prospective investors, were largely
against Party building by the CCP, even in an international and open market
like Hong Kong. This is surprising given the close relationship between
Mainland China and Hong Kong and because many Chinese businesses in
Hong Kong are SOEs.
Moreover, among the companies that adopted Party building
provisions, they were willing to accept some degree of organizational or
managerial interference. However, they did not adopt provisions that gave
the Party direct control over personnel or human resources decisions. Thus,
even if companies adopted Party building, managers and shareholders were
resigned to the fact that Party organizations might have already existed inside
the company, and that it was good to maintain some cordial relationship with
the CCP. Nevertheless, corporate stakeholders were not keen to accept more
direct intrusion into management, such as promoting personnel or even
controlling the board of directors through the Party secretary. In conclusion,
the market and corporate stakeholders have some effective responses to the
CCP’s Party building campaign by either not adopting or adopting less
harmful forms of interference. Securities regulators should adopt a marketdriven approach, through transparency requirements that empower managers
and shareholders to correct for external political interference, instead of
direct interventions like mandatory delisting.

209. See supra Part III.B.2.

